Florida State University Law Review
Volume 41

Issue 3

Article 4

Spring 2014

Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy
Storage
Amy L. Stein
Tulane University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Energy and Utilities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 697 (2013) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol41/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

RECONSIDERING REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY:
MAKING A CASE FOR ENERGY STORAGE
AMY L. STEIN *
ABSTRACT
This Article begins the complex dialogue that must take place to address the emerging
technologies providing energy storage for our electricity grid. Energy storage has the
capacity to be a game-changer for many facets of our grid, providing better integration of
renewable energy, enhanced reliability, and reduced use of carbon-intensive fuels. Energy
storage faces a number of obstacles, however, including technological, financial, and
regulatory uncertainty. This Article focuses on the regulatory uncertainty, and defends the
proposition that not all regulatory uncertainty is created equal. It argues for differential
treatment of this uncertainty, depending on its context, scope, and source, and applies this
framework to the uncertainty surrounding the classification of energy storage. It finds that
this uncertainty operates against high baseline levels of uncertainty in the energy industry,
is limited in its scope, and is intentionally embraced by the federal regulators in an effort to
realize the benefits of regulatory uncertainty. This Article asserts that this form of
uncertainty is one that can be managed in a way to avoid stifling the development of this
important technology. This Article sets forth strategies for regulators and regulated entities
to continue to function, even within this zone of regulatory uncertainty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Few people think about electricity and grid reliability until they
lose power. “There have been five massive [electricity] blackouts [in
the United States] over the past 40 years, three of which have
occurred in the past nine years.”1 In 2003, the United States suffered
its largest blackout in history, affecting about forty-five million
people and costing approximately six billion dollars in losses. 2 Nine
nuclear power plants shut down, cities were left without water,
flights were grounded, and traffic chaos ensued in rush hour without
traffic signals. 3 In the summer of 2011, Texas barely avoided rolling
blackouts, and only by paying up to thirty times the normal price of
electricity.4 The Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that power
outages and interruptions cost Americans more than 150 billion
dollars each year. 5 Extreme weather events associated with climate
change, combined with aging energy infrastructure, suggests that the
frequency of such blackouts is likely to increase before it decreases. 6
In addition to power disruptions, our grid is plagued by a number
of inefficiencies. Within our current grid, electricity must be used
instantaneously, meaning there is tremendous pressure on our
nation’s grid operators to ensure that the demand (or load) is
constantly in equal balance with the supply. 7 This has led to a

1. LITOS STRATEGIC COMMC’N, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID: AN
INTRODUCTION 7, available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/Documentsand
Media/ DOE_SG_Book_Single_Pages(1).pdf (prepared for the U.S. Dep’t of Energy).
2. Id. at 8-9.
3. Jaime Holguin, Biggest Blackout in U.S. History, CBS NEWS (Aug. 15, 2003),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/biggest-blackout-in-us-history.
4. Packing Some Power, ECONOMIST (May 3, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/
21548495.
5. LITOS STRATEGIC COMMC’N, supra note 1, at 5.
6. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITIES TO CLIMATE
CHANGE AND EXTREME WEATHER 2-3, 35 (2013), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/07/
f2/20130710-Energy-Sector-Vulnerabilities-Report.pdf; Superstorm Sandy: More Than 7
Million Without Power, CBS NEWS (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
superstorm-sandy-more-than-7-million-without-power/ (noting Superstorm Sandy left 7.9
million customers across the Mid-Atlantic States and New England without power).
7. Regulatory Organizations, W. FARMERS ELEC. COOP., http://www.wfec.com/
operations/governing-bodies (last visited June 14, 2014) (“Unlike water or gas, electricity
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preference for baseload sources that can run at near one-hundred
percent capacity and expensive construction and maintenance of
“peaker plants,” which are power plants that are only called upon for
a few hours each day to cover the large disparity between off-peak
and on-peak electricity demands.8 Additionally, millions of potential
megawatt-hours of electricity generation from intermittent
renewable energy resources like wind and solar are wasted due to
transmission constraints. 9 This wasted renewable energy is
particularly ironic, given our nation’s efforts to better integrate
renewable energy into our electricity portfolio 10 and to reduce the
conventional pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions emitted from
fossil fuels.11
Although these costs and inefficiencies are diverse, they all can be
addressed through one technology: energy storage. Energy storage in
this context refers not to the storage of a primary fuel such as
natural gas, but the energy storage of previously generated electric
energy (potential, kinetic, chemical, or thermal energy) to be released
at a later time. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
defines an energy storage asset as “property that is interconnected to
the electrical grid and is designed to receive electrical energy, to store
such electrical energy as another energy form, and to convert such
energy back to electricity and deliver such electricity for sale, or to
use such energy to provide reliability or economic benefits to the
cannot be stored. It must be generated as it is needed, and supply must be kept in balance
with demand.”).
8. See, e.g., Abby Gruen, ‘Peakers’ Plants Provide Electricity When It’s Hot, but at the
Highest Price, STAR-LEDGER (July 20, 2010, 2:51 PM), http://www.nj.com/business/
index.ssf/2010/07/peakers_plants_provide_electri.html (explaining that “peakers” are
comparatively expensive to operate, costing ratepayers thirteen million dollars annually to
keep a single peaker plant in New Jersey operational).
9. See, e.g., William Pentland, Transmission Bottlenecks Bad News for Renewable
Energy, FORBES (May 3, 2011, 11:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/
2011/05/03/transmission-bottlenecks-bad-news-for-renewable-energy/ (“In some areas
where the constraints are especially acute like Oregon and Washington State, the lack of
spare transmission capacity could force wind farms that have already been built to shut
down on a rolling basis in the near future.”).
10. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Remarks by
the President on Climate Change at Georgetown University (June 25, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-change
(“Today, I'm directing the Interior Department to green light enough private, renewable
energy capacity on public lands to power more than 6 million homes by 2020.”).
11. See U.S. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–
2011, at 3-5 to -7 (2013) [hereinafter EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS]; Clean Energy: Air Emissions, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2013) (“Fossil
fuel-fired power plants are responsible for 67 percent of the nation’s sulfur dioxide
emissions, 23 percent of nitrogen oxide emissions, and 40 percent of man-made carbon
dioxide emissions.”).
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grid.” 12 By eliminating the historical limitation of the grid requiring
instantaneous use, energy storage has the potential to drastically
alter the way the electricity grid functions. 13
Some forms of energy storage, such as pumped hydropower
storage, have been the historic face of bulk energy storage 14 for over a
hundred years. 15 But the world is bracing for the next generation of
bulk energy storage to address reliability, economic efficiency, and
environmental issues plaguing the electric grid. In addition to
pumped hydropower storage, this next generation will expand to
include some combination of batteries, flywheels, fuel cells,
superconducting magnets, and compressed air energy storage.
While these emerging technologies bring great promise, they also
bring great uncertainty. There is uncertainty about the specific
technologies that will be cost-effective for the grid, the market forces
that will drive energy investments, the legal and regulatory
12. Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting and Financial Reporting
for New Electric Storage Technologies, Order No. 784, 144 FERC ¶ 61,056, ¶ 172 (July 18,
2013) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 784]; see also CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ELECTRIC
ENERGY STORAGE: AN ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 2-3
(2010), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/71859AF5-2D26-4262-BF5262DE85C0 E942/0/CPUCStorageWhitePaper7910.pdf (“[Electric energy] storage can be
defined as: a set of technologies capable of storing previously generated electric energy and
releasing that energy at a later time. EES technologies may store electrical energy as
potential, kinetic, chemical, or thermal energy, and include various types of batteries,
flywheels, electrochemical capacitors, compressed air storage, thermal storage devices and
pumped hydroelectric power.”).
13. In fact, some utilities view energy storage as a “disruptive force.” PETER KIND,
EDISON ELEC. INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC
RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 3 (2013), available at
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/Documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf. Although one
could only imagine utilities as obsolete if there was a fully viable distributed energy
alternative, a prospect that does not seem feasible in the short-term, the same was
probably said about telephone customers not being able to “cut the cord” from their phone
company, yet now many have chosen to go completely cellular. Id. at 5. There are many
similarities between the energy grid and the telecommunications network, see Amy L.
Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217 (2012), and plummeting
profits on the road to such “disruptive” transitions is one similarity that they may not
choose to share.
14. Bulk energy “refers to the network of interconnected generation and transmission
lines, while the distribution system refers to the lower-voltage generally radial lines that
deliver electricity to the final customer.” 4 NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., BULK
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS: OPERATIONS AND TRANSMISSION PLANNING 22-1 (2012),
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/52409-4.pdf.
15. There is approximately twenty-two gigawatts (GW) of pumped-storage
hydropower (PSH) deployed in the United States across forty sites, most of which was
developed between 1970 and 1990. Pumped Storage Provides Grid Reliability Even with
Net Loss, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 8, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.cfm?id=11991; see also PAUL DENHOLM ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., THE
ROLE OF ENERGY STORAGE WITH RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY GENERATION 7-8 (2010),
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/47187.pdf.
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environment into which energy storage will be thrust, and their
integration into resource adequacy and transmission planning. 16 This
Article does not purport to tackle all of this uncertainty, but focuses
on the regulatory uncertainty facing energy storage entities. 17 To
simplify syntax, however, this Article will refer to “regulatory
uncertainty” as “uncertainty” wherever possible.
One of the most fundamental uncertainties surrounds whether
energy storage is treated as a generation, transmission, or
distribution asset, a classification that affects jurisdictional and costrecovery determinations.18 Such uncertainties are regularly cited as
barriers to energy storage development,19 as they are in many other

16. For instance, grid operators may be most affected by the technological uncertainty
of the response time, duration, and availability of energy storage and their integration into
resource adequacy and transmission planning.
17. Christian Engau & Volker H. Hoffmann, Corporate Response Strategies to
Regulatory Uncertainty: Evidence from Uncertainty About Post-Kyoto Regulation, 44 POL’Y
SCI. 53, 54 (2011) (“[T]he term ‘regulatory uncertainty’ . . . refer[s] to uncertainty
associated with the actions of governmental agencies that create and enforce regulations
and [is] define[d] . . . as a firm’s ‘inability to predict the future state of the regulatory
environment.’ ” (internal citations omitted)); Frances J. Milliken, Three Types of Perceived
Uncertainty About the Environment: State, Effect, and Response Uncertainty, 12 ACAD. OF
MGMT. REV. 133, 136 (1987). This definition is not entirely unsatisfactory, proposing to
encompass almost any situation where regulated entities cannot predict the future. A
better definition may be ambiguity caused by agency inaction, delays, changes in
leadership, inconsistencies, vagueness, or similar actions.
18. The traditional public utility model operates on a system of cost-of-service
ratemaking, whereby a public utility commission (PUC) approves a rate that a utility may
charge its customers based on a base rate, multiplied by a rate of return and operating
costs. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, COST OF SERVICE RATES MANUAL 6-7 (1999),
available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/gen-info/cost-of-service-manual.doc. Energy
assets receive unusual regulatory treatment in most states because they are regulated as a
natural monopoly, in which energy providers charge customers in their territory a rate set
by the state (or, for wholesale transmission, FERC), and the state must approve decisions
about what infrastructure and other costs the providers may recover through the rates. See
infra Part III.
19. See ANITA LUONG, AM. INST. OF CHEM. ENG’RS, GRID SCALE ENERGY STORAGE:
ADDRESSING THE REGULATORY AND POLICY BARRIERS 21 (2011), available at
http://www.wise-intern.org/journal/2011/documents/ALuong_Final_GridScaleEnergyStorage_
2nded.pdf (“Regulatory barriers are the main challenges that deployment of grid-scale
energy storage face.”); Thomas P. Lyon & Jing Li, Regulatory Uncertainty and
Regulatory Scope 3 (July 11, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228416428_Regulatory_uncertainty_and_regulato
ry_scope/file/79e4150ed778a9549a.pdf (“[T]he former chairman of the Massachusetts
Public Utilities Commission lament[ed] the fact that ‘[a] wide range of tools is available . . .
to enhance grid flexibility. Uptake of these technologies, however, has languished in an
environment of regulatory uncertainty.’ ”); Rick Drom, Andrews Kurth LLP, Critical
Drivers for Utility-Scale Renewable Energy 18 (Jan. 19, 2011) (PowerPoint presentation),
available
at
http://www.acore.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/smart-grid-regulatoryDrom.pdf (“Regulatory certainty is necessary to reduce investor risk and provide for
continued development of Energy Storage technologies.”).
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emerging technology contexts. 20 For instance, the DOE notes that
“[r]egulatory issues at the federal and state level may limit the value
proposition for energy storage and removing them may be necessary
to level the playing field with other technologies.” 21 “Overall, the
value of storage is highly system-dependent, location-dependent, and
subject to risk and uncertainty; technical, regulatory, and
financial.” 22 State legislators and regulators make similar
statements, as exemplified by California’s recent energy storage bill 23
and accompanying California Public Utility Commission orders. 24
Instead of clarifying this uncertainty, FERC explicitly embraced
it, pointing to the fact-specific nature of the inquiry required of
energy storage technologies, technologies that are capable of
performing any and all of the functions traditionally attributed to
generation, transmission, and distribution assets.25 Stakeholders
criticize the resulting uncertainty and argue that lingering ambiguity
surrounding such fundamental issues can stifle investments in

20. See City of Dearborn v. Comcast of Michigan III, Inc., No. 08-10156, 2008 WL
4534167, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2008) (“The rise in cable television technology initially
created legislative and regulatory uncertainty.” (citing Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC,
529 F.3d 763, 767 (6th Cir. 2008))); Robert Falkner & Nico Jaspers, Regulating
Nanotechnologies: Risk, Uncertainty and the Global Governance Gap, 12 GLOBAL ENVTL.
POL. 30, 31 (discussing regulatory challenges in the burgeoning field of nanotechnology);
Alfred A. Marcus, Policy Uncertainty and Technological Innovation, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
443, 443-44 (1981) (exploring the effects of regulatory uncertainty on the development of
then-emerging technologies such as cogeneration and the use of composite fuels made of
pulverized coal); Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable
Energy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1691 (2012) (“Regulatory uncertainty is an obvious and
significant barrier to consistent investor confidence in renewable energy.”); Kevin Drum,
Carbon Pricing and Regulatory Uncertainty, MOTHER JONES (July 26, 2010),
http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/07/carbon-pricing-and-regulatory-uncertainty.
21. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANALYTIC CHALLENGES TO VALUING ENERGY STORAGE 2
(2011).
22. Id. at 3.
23. A.B. 2514, 2009 Leg., 10th Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (amending CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 2536 (West 2009) & CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 454.3, 9615, 9620 (West 2009)),
available
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_2501-2550/ab_2514_bill_
20100820_amended_sen_v90.html [hereinafter Cal. A.B. 2514] (“There are significant
barriers to obtaining the benefits of energy storage systems, including . . . inadequate
statutory and regulatory support.”).
24. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Order Instituting Rulemaking Pursuant to Assembly Bill
2514 to Consider the Rulemaking 10-12-007 at 3 (Dec. 16, 2010), available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M065/K706/65706057.PDF
(identifying
the “[l]ack of cohesive regulatory framework” as one of the primary barriers to energy
storage).
25. Eric Wesoff, FERC’s Commissioner on Energy Storage, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan.
18,
2011),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-view-from-ferc-on-energystorage/.
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energy storage and disrupt the long-term planning involved in such
capital-intensive endeavors. 26
Investment in energy storage need not be stifled by regulatory
uncertainty. In fact, FERC’s embrace of ambiguity with respect to
energy storage provides an opportunity to reconsider the role of this
uncertainty. This evaluation demonstrates that there are multiple
varieties of uncertainty with differing degrees of impacts. This
multifaceted view of uncertainty—along a spectrum—suggests that
the responses may be similarly varied. This Article does not claim to
resolve the uncertainty associated with energy storage, but instead
argues that the uncertainty is manageable, and perhaps even
beneficial to an emerging technology. To this end, this Article also
sets forth a path toward resolving the uncertainty.
Part II of this Article explores the fundamentals of energy storage
and its attendant uncertainty. This Part provides a flavor for the
various energy storage technologies that make up this catchall term.
It explains the multiple functions and value streams of energy
storage that contribute to their complicated legal status. It then
analyzes the fundamental uncertainty surrounding FERC’s
treatment of bulk energy storage as a generation or a transmission
asset and the resulting jurisdictional and cost recovery implications.
Part III defends the proposition that not all uncertainty is created
equal. For instance, some uncertainty is the result of coordination
problems involving multiple actors, some uncertainty is the result of
a single actor, some uncertainty surrounds whether an activity will
be regulated at all, and some uncertainty surrounds how an activity
will be regulated. It explores situations where uncertainty is
particularly troublesome and those situations where the law has
embraced uncertainty. It creates a new framework for evaluating and
characterizing these different varieties of uncertainty along a
spectrum, depending on three critical features: (1) the context, (2) the
scope, and (3) the source of the uncertainty. Whereas high levels of
uncertainty may justify avoiding the uncertainty, low levels of
uncertainty associated with an activity are more deserving of efforts
to resolve the uncertainty.
Applying this framework to the uncertainty facing energy storage
reveals a level of uncertainty that can be managed in a way to avoid
stifling the development of this important technology. When the
critical features of energy storage uncertainty are analyzed, it
becomes clear that this uncertainty is consistent with the general
uncertainty that surrounds the energy industry, the scope is
narrower than other types of uncertainty, and the source of the
26. See infra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
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uncertainty is one federal agency intentionally seeking to reap the
advantages of energy storage in a world where the law is struggling
to keep up with the technology.
Given its place on the uncertainty spectrum, Part IV proposes
strategies for stakeholders and regulators to continue to function
within this zone of uncertainty. This is particularly important for an
emerging technology that is required to compete against entrenched
incumbent fossil fuel generators.27 It explains how regulated entities
can harness the benefits of federalism by encouraging state
initiatives, developing precedent through FERC orders, and
continuing to acquire important information necessary for eventual
resolution of the uncertainty. Part IV describes how regulators can
help narrow the range of uncertainty as well. Public utility
commissions can craft creative cost recovery mechanisms, and FERC
can develop a framework for its decisionmaking process that will
guide and provide consistency for future case-by-case determinations.
These efforts can establish gradual norms that narrow the range of
uncertainty so that it does not paralyze the deployment of energy
storage technologies.
The hope is that, similar to other emerging technologies, “the
relative novelty of these [new emerging] technologies . . . suggests
that the interests on different sides of each issue are less likely to
have ossified into permanent resistance to compromise,” allowing
more room for both the regulator and the regulated to work together
to resolve uncertainty. 28 Such strategies can have implications for
emerging technologies operating in the shadow of uncertainty that
extend far beyond energy storage.
II. ENERGY STORAGE AND ITS REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY
Most individuals are surprised to learn about the extent of energy
storage projects that are already functioning on a commercial level.
They may be even more surprised to learn that the federal
government has identified over seventeen different applications of
energy storage for the electricity grid.29 This Part begins by providing
27. Jon Wellinghoff, the chairman of FERC from 2009–2013, said in an interview in
2013 that solar will “overtake everything,” and said that once storage is brought into the
equation it is pretty much “game over” for traditional forms of generation. Herman K.
Trabish, FERC Chair Jon Wellinghoff: Solar ‘Is Going to Overtake Everything’,
GREENTECHMEDIA (Aug. 21, 2013),http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ferc-chairwellinghoff-sees-a-solar-future-and-a-utility-of-the-future.
28. David A. Strifling, Environmental Federalism and Effective Regulation of
Nanotechnology, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1131, 1159 (2010).
29. JIM EYER & GARTH COREY, SANDIA NAT’L LABS., ENERGY STORAGE FOR THE
ELECTRICITY GRID: BENEFITS AND MARKET POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT GUIDE 21 tbl.3 (2010).
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an introduction to various types of energy storage technologies.
It then explains the various benefits of energy storage for our
electrical grid. It concludes by analyzing the primary uncertainty
facing energy storage: how to classify energy storage assets according
to the existing taxonomy that was designed for more traditional
energy sources.
A. Energy Storage Technologies
Bulk energy storage consists of a suite of technologies used to hold
the energy from previously generated electricity at times of low
demand until demand is high or transmission lines are freed up to
transmit the electricity. 30 Bulk energy storage in the United States is
dominated by pumped-storage hydropower (PSH), a century-old
technology that uses cheaper off-peak electricity to pump water from
a lower to an upper reservoir and then releases the water to turn
turbines to generate electricity during on-peak hours. 31 Although it
has the capacity to provide price advantages, PSH has generated its
share of controversy over the years, with critics pointing to energy
inefficiencies and adverse environmental impacts of damming
water. 32 There are approximately twenty-two gigawatts (GW) of PSH
deployed in the United States across forty sites, much of which was
built between 1970 and 1990.33 Pumped storage developers have
30. “Bulk” storage or “grid-scale” storage is to be distinguished from “distributed”
energy storage, which involves a smaller, customer-specific application. Included in this
form of energy storage are electric vehicle batteries and on-site generators. Compare
InterContinental Hotels Group, DOE GLOBAL ENERGY STORAGE DATABASE, SANDIA NAT’L
LABS., http://www.energystorageexchange.org/projects/356 (last visited June 14, 2014)
(detailing distributed energy storage projects at two San Francisco hotels that utilize
Lithium ion batteries to avoid high demand charges), with KCP&L SmartGrid Innovation
Park,
DOE GLOBAL ENERGY STORAGE DATABASE,
SANDIA NAT’L LABS.,
http://www.energystorageexchange.org/projects/1297 (last visited June 14, 2014) (deploying
similar battery storage technology to support grid-scale energy delivery at peak demand
times of day in Kansas City). Tesla’s plans for a new $5 billion “gigafactory” has a projected
output of 35 GW per year, which would exceed the worldwide production of lithium ion
batteries in 2013. Thomas Overton, The Year Energy Storage Hit Its Stride, POWER MAG.
(May 1, 2014), http://www.powermag.com/the-year-energy-storage-hit-its-stride.
31. Chi-Jen Yang & Robert B. Jackson, Opportunities and Barriers to Pumped-Hydro
Energy Storage in the United States, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS 839,
839-40 (2011).
32. E.g., Eric Wesoff, Update: California Energy Storage Bill AB 2514 Signed Into
Law by Governor, GREENTECHMEDIA (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.greentechmedia.com/
articles/read/vc-cmeas-gunderson-on-utility-scale-storage (“In California, ‘we’re taking
down dams not putting them up.’ ”).
33. Pumped Storage, supra note 15 (“There are 40 pumped storage sites operating in
the United States . . . totaling more than 22 gigawatts (GW) of storage capacity, roughly
2% of U.S. generating capacity.”); see also DEHOLM ET AL., supra note 15, at 7-8 & n.14 (“To
place these values in perspective, between 1993 and 2008, more than 320 GW of
conventional capacity was constructed in the United States. With the exception of the
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refined the technology to increase efficiency,34 and the international
interest in PSH is growing. 35 Nevertheless, this form of storage is
geographically constrained.
The next generation of grid-scale energy storage includes
compressed air energy storage (CAES), a technology that uses offpeak energy to drive compressors that inject air into an underground
storage cavern.36 The air heats as it is compressed, and this heat
energy is later released to turn turbines and generate electricity back
onto the grid during on-peak hours. Only one large CAES 110
megawatt (MW) commercial facility has been constructed in the
United States in McIntosh, Alabama, but it is leading the way for
future projects. 37 CAES projects are planning to move forward in both
Ohio 38 and Texas,39 and Nebraska 40 may not be far behind. Recent
completion of previously started PHS facilities and a few demonstration projects, no
significant storage capacity was added.”).
34. NAT’L HYDROPOWER ASS’N’S PUMPED STORAGE DEV. COUNCIL, CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT 2-3 (2012), available at
http://www.hydro.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/NHA_PumpedStorage_071212b12.pdf
[hereinafter CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES].
35. “Since 1990, global hydropower generation has increased by 50%.” INT’L ENERGY
AGENCY, RENEWABLE ENERGY ESSENTIALS: HYDROPOWER 1 (2010), available at
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Hydropower_Essentials.pdf.
36. CH2MHILL, PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION GREENHOUSE GAS
PERMIT APPLICATION, at i (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/region6/6pd/air/pdr/ghg/apex-matagorda-app.pdf.
37. The first CAES plant, a 290 megawatt facility, was built in Huntorf, Germany in
1978. Thirteen years later, the 110 megawatt McIntosh CAES plant began operations in
Alabama. The plants have a combined 50-year-plus lifetime. Id. at 5-11.
38. In Ohio, Norton Energy is proposing to use a limestone mine to store compressed
air. In November 2009, Akron utility FirstEnergy bought the rights and plans to revive the
development, which would be in an abandoned limestone mine in Norton, Ohio.
Haddington Sells Rights to its Norton Energy Storage Project to FirstEnergy, PR NEWSWIRE
(Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.prnewswire.com/new-releases/haddingtong-sells-rights-to-itsnorton-energy-storage-project-to-firstenergy-71572382.html.
39. In Texas, Apex has recently received approval for a 350 million-dollar-plus Bethel
Energy Center, slated to be a 319 MW facility. Scheduled to open in 2016, Bethel Energy
Center will be the first CAES to use wind power to condense the air. Paul Stone, Anderson
County Getting Energy Center, PALESTINE HERALD-PRESS (July 11, 2012),
http://palestineherald.com/local/x941521205/Anderson-County-getting-energy-center;
see
also Apex Bethel Energy Center, APEX CAES, http://www.apexcaes.com/project (last visited
June 14, 2014). In 2012, General Compression commissioned a two megawatts CAES
facility to integrate a windfarm in Texas. Texas Dispatchable Wind 1, LLC,
GENERALCOMPRESSION, http://www.generalcompression.com/index.php/tdw1 (last visited
June 14, 2014).
40. In late 2011, the Nebraska Public Power District announced that it planned to buy
the rights to store compressed air in sandstone formations in the western part of that state.
Dan Haugen, Scrapped Iowa Project Leaves Energy Storage Lessons, MIDWEST ENERGY
NEWS, (Jan. 19, 2012) http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2012/01/19/scrapped-iowaproject-leaves-energy-storage-lessons/. However, Iowa Stored Energy Park, a cooperative in
Iowa funded in part by the Department of Energy, was abandoned after data revealed that
the geology would not properly support a compressed air storage facility. Id.
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demonstration projects are even trying to break CAES free from its
geological shackles by storing air in existing pipelines 41 and steel air
storage tanks 42 instead of underground, an advance that would
render CAES much more mobile.
Other storage generally takes three additional forms: (1) electrochemical (batteries), (2) mechanical (flywheels), and (3) thermal
energy. Batteries can take many forms (Li-ion, NaS, NiCd, Metal Air,
lead acid, liquid, etc.), each with their own strengths and weaknesses
depending on whether they are evaluated based on energy, power, or
dischargeability. 43 But many other types are racing to the commercial
finish line. The primary limitations associated with batteries,
however, are the costs and the size of the battery required to store a
meaningful amount of electricity. 44 One of the world’s largest battery
storage facilities is operating in Fairbanks, Alaska. The Alaskan
battery is larger than a football field, yet can only provide enough
electricity for 12,000 residents for seven minutes.45
Efforts to develop smaller, more effective batteries are slowly
taking hold. Duke Energy has installed a thirty-six MW advancedlead acid battery at the Notrees Wind Farm in Texas, connecting to
Texas’ grid operator, Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).46
AES Energy Storage owns and operates an eight MW lithium-ion
battery plant in Johnson City that provides rapid frequency
regulation services to New York’s grid operator, New York
Independent Service Operator (NYISO) 47 and the world’s largest
41. E.g., SustainX Begins Startup of World’s First Grid-Scale Isothermal Compressed
Air Energy Storage System, SUSTAINX (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.sustainx.com/e9c13ca1134c-49e9-9031-036592c1b37a/about-us-news-events-detail.htm.
42. E.g., Technology, LIGHTSAIL ENERGY, http://www.lightsail.com (last visited June
14, 2014).
43. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, GRID ENERGY STORAGE 17-20 (2013), available at
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/12/f5/Grid%20Energy%20Storage%20December%202
013.pdf; see also ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., ELECTRICITY ENERGY STORAGE
TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS (2010).
44. ABBAS A. AKHIL ET AL., SANDIA NAT’L LABS., DOE/EPRI 2013 ELECTRICITY
STORAGE HANDBOOK IN COLLABORATION WITH NRECA app. E at 6 (2013), available at
http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/SAND2013-5131.pdf.
45. See, e.g., Jon R. Luoma, The Challenge for Green Energy: How to Store Excess
Electricity, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (July 13, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/
the_challenge_for_green_energy_how_to_store_excess_electricity/2170/.
46. Tina Casey, North America’s Largest Wind Energy Storage Facility Fires Up in
Texas, CLEAN TECHNICA (Jan. 24, 2013) http://cleantechnica.com/2013/01/24/largest-windenergy-storage-facility-in-u-s-fires-up-in-texas/; Duke Energy to Deploy Energy Storage
Technology at Texas Wind Farm, DUKE ENERGY (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.dukeenergy.com/news/releases/2011041402.asp.
47. Eric Bloom, Energy Storage on the Grid in the New Year, NAVIGANT RESEARCH
BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011), http://navigantresearch.com/blog/articles/energy-storage-on-the-gridin-the-new-year.
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lithium-ion battery farm (thirty-two MW) in West Virginia.48 Primus
Power is on track to deliver EnergyPodsTM to California’s Modesto
Irrigation District starting in 2014.49 Xtreme Power deployed about
seventy-eight MW of energy storage projects by the time this Article
went to print, including several in Hawaii. 50 The financial press has
ever-increasing numbers of press releases, with different institutions
touting their respective breakthroughs on battery energy storage. 51
Similar discussions surround fuel cells, a technology that functions
like batteries through electrochemical processes.52 Battery storage is
expanding on an international level as well, with Japan, India, and
China coupling storage with telecommunications towers. 53
Flywheels reflect yet another form of energy storage. Flywheels
accelerate a rotor to a very high speed and maintain the energy in
the system as rotational energy—energy that is available instantly
when needed by slowing down the flywheel.54 New York is home to
the first flywheel storage plant. With help from the New York State
Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA), Beacon
Power has developed a twenty MW flywheel energy storage plan in
Stephentown, New York. 55 Although it has been successful in
48. Ucilia Wong, The World’s Largest Lithium-Ion Battery Farm Comes Online,
FORBES (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2011/10/27/worlds-largestlithium-ion-battery-farm/.
49. See DEP’T OF ENERGY, PRIMUS POWER CORP., WIND FIRMING ENERGYFARM (Aug.
2013), https://www.smartgrid.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/project_desc/OE0000228_Fact%25
20Sheet_Primus%2520Jul2013_3.0%5B1%5D.pdf; Tom Stepien, Primus Power, Wind
Firming EnergyFarm (Sept. 25, 2012) (PowerPoint presentation), available at
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/ESS%202012%20Peer%20Review%20-%20Wind%20Firming
%20EnergyFarm%20-%20Tom%20Stepien%2C%20Primus%20Power.pdf.
50. See Proven & Flexible Storage Solutions: Experience, XTREME POWER,
http://www.xtremepower.com/advantage/experience (last visited June 14, 2014).
51. See, e.g., Luoma, supra note 45 (“Early this year, IBM revealed that it was
launching a major research program into what looks like an even more promising
technology—the lithium metal-air battery. Last month, a company called PolyPlus
announced that it had already succeeded in developing one.”); Kevin Bullis, TR10: Liquid
Battery, MIT TECHNOLOGY REV. (Mar./Apr. 2009). http://www2.technologyreview.com/
article/412190/tr10-liquid-battery/ (MIT suggesting that liquid batteries are going to make
it to commercialization first). Bill Gates invested in Aquion, a new environmentally sound
battery made with saltwater instead of lithium that can create environmental disposal
problems. Andrew Herndon, Bill Gates Invests in Battery Maker Aquion Energy,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-02/bill-gates-investsin-battery-maker-aquion-energy.html.
52. Haugen, supra note 40 (proposing a technology that would convert excess wind
energy at night to hydrogen used in a fuel cell).
53. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 43, at 13-14.
54. Technology, BEACON POWER, http://beaconpower.com/?page_id=103 (last visited
June 14, 2014).
55. Bradford P. Roberts, Energy Storage Solutions, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, May
2012, at 46, 49-50, available at http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2012/05/energystorage-solutions; Matt Lazarewicz & Judith Judson, Performance of First 20 MW
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providing frequency regulation to New York’s grid and “[i]ts
performance has influenced both regulatory and legislative
initiatives,” 56 Beacon Power recently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
and needed to be restructured to continue development. 57
A last form of energy storage, generally not used for bulk system
storage, is thermal energy storage. A common thermal energy storage
system “chills a storage medium [usually water, ice, or a phasechange material] during periods of low cooling demand and then uses
the stored cooling later to meet air‐ conditioning load or process
cooling loads.”58 California, for instance, recently began installing
fifty-three MW in distributed ice storage across rooftops. 59 Although
it is unclear which form of “new generation” energy storage will
ultimately prevail for widespread commercialization, it is becoming
clear that some form of energy storage is on the horizon.
B. Value of Energy Storage
Energy storage has varied benefits, depending on its type and
purpose.60 Many types of energy storage are able to provide multiple
services, and therefore yield multiple benefits. 61 A productive
economy requires significant amounts of electricity, and demand is
Commercial Flywheel Frequency Regulation Plant, BEACONPOWER (June 7, 2011),
http://www.beaconpower.com/files/Beacon_Power_presentation_ESA%206_7_11_FINAL.pdf.
56. Roberts, supra note 55, at 50.
57. Jeff Postelwait, Beacon Power Emerges From Bankruptcy With New Energy
Storage Project, ELEC. LIGHT & POWER (June 24, 2013), http://www.elp.com/articles/
2013/06/beacon-power-emerges-from-bankruptcy-with-new-energy-storage-project.html
(noting the company was acquired by Rockland Capital, which assumed 25 million dollars
of its outstanding DOE-guaranteed load plus provided additional cash and equity to
finance a second flywheel plant).
58. PUB. INT. ENERGY RESEARCH PROGRAM, 2020 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF ENERGY IN
CALIFORNIA 58 (2011), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011publications/CEC-5002011-047/CEC-500-2011-047.pdf.
59. Ice Energy Project, S. CAL. PUB. POWER AUTH., http://www.scppa.org/
pages/projects/ice_energy.html (last visited June 14, 2014).
60. ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., 2012 STORAGE REPORT: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 13 (2012) (These benefits can
be felt in different degrees by various actors in the energy regime. The ISO/RTO
transmission operators can benefit from energy storage through a number of mechanisms:
ancillary services, real time energy balancing, energy price arbitrage, and resource
adequacy. Generators can use it for intermittent resource integration for wind and solar,
and supply firming. Transmission/Distribution can use it for peak shaving, to defer
upgrade, provide relief from congestions, and transmission operation. End users/customers
can use it for outage mitigation in microgrids, time of use energy management, power
quality, and back-up power.).
61. One of the main benefits of energy storage is its ability to provide multiple
services, including load leveling (and associated benefits such as a reduction in cyclinginduced maintenance) along with regulation and contingency reserves and firm capacity.
DENHOLM ET AL., supra note 15; see Strifling, supra note 28.
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only projected to increase in the future. 62 Nearly every modern
convenience—like computers, cell phones, machinery, and lights—is
at the mercy of adequate electricity flows. The energy demand (or
load) becomes even greater in the summertime, when air
conditioning units in at least half of the country are running fulltime. Although the market and regulators are still coming to grips
with how to properly quantify these values without double-counting,
investors should take confidence in the government’s recognition of
the four primary categories of energy storage benefits involving
resource adequacy planning, adapting to changing public policy
goals, and continuing to provide safe and cost-effective electricity:
(1) reliability, (2) lower costs, (3) efficient production, and (4)
environmental benefits. 63
1. Reliability
A first benefit of energy storage is its ability to enhance the
reliability of the grid. These reliability benefits can come in the form
of backup electricity in times of power outages, enhanced power
quality to prevent outages, and frequency regulation that adjusts for
differences between grid operators’ predictions and actual demand.
Backup Electricity. The concept of backup electricity is far from
novel. Hospitals and other emergency service providers have been
relying on back-up generators for many years.64 Santa Rita jail in
California, one of the largest inmate facilities, has taken steps
to insulate itself from the risk of power outages by being one of the
first microgrids capable of isolating itself from the traditional grid, in

62. The Energy Information Administration estimates a twenty-nine percent increase
in electricity demand by 2040 (to 4954 billion kilowatthours). U.S. ENERGY INFO ADMIN,
ANNUAL
ENERGY
OUTLOOK
2014
MT-16
(2014),
available
at
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2014).pdf.
63. “In its 2009 Smart Grid Policy proposed policy statement, the FERC justified
giving energy storage a high priority in smart grid standards development and cost
recovery, based in large part on the benefits energy storage affords in integrating what the
FERC termed ‘unprecedented’ amounts of variable generation resources. It pointed to the
ability of energy storage to address three issues it saw attending large amounts of variable
generation on the grid: resource adequacy concerns (the loss of variable generation during
peak periods or critical times), resource management (the potential for over-generation
during off-peak, low-load periods), and system stability concerns (that occur when there is
high penetration of variable resources with low inertia properties). The FERC also noted
the potential for energy storage to optimize bulk power production and facilitate power
system balancing, among other benefits.” Margaret Caffey et al., Report of the Renewable
Energy Committee, 32 ENERGY L.J. 405, 427-29 (2011) (citing Smart Grid Policy, 126 FERC
¶ 61,253, ¶¶ 18-20 (Mar. 19, 2009)); see also ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 60.
64. Will Gruver, Diesel Power Generators for Hospitals and Prisons, US POWER &
ENV’T (2007), http://www.uspowerco.com/articles/diesel_power_generators_for_hospitals_
and_pri.
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part based on the energy storage onsite. 65 This type of distributed
storage also is particularly useful in times of power outages due
to weather-related disruptions, which are often sporadic and
short-lived. For instance, Hurricane Sandy provided a platform for a
few energy storage facilities operating in New York to demonstrate
their success. 66
Power Quality. Energy storage also can assist in a general class of
services referred to as power quality and system stability. The
National Renewable Energy Laboratories describes it well:
Power quality refers to voltage spikes, sags, momentary outages,
and harmonics. Storage devices are often used at customer load
sites to buffer sensitive equipment against power quality issues.
Electric power systems also can experience oscillations of
frequency and voltage. Unless damped, these disturbances can
limit the ability of utilities to transmit power and affect the
stability and reliability of the entire system. System stability
requires response times of less than a second, and can be met by a
variety of devices including fast-responding energy storage. 67

Frequency Regulation. Grid operator projections of supply and
demand do not always mirror reality. In fact, most days require some
last-minute injections or withdrawals to correct for the gaps between
supply and demand. “Frequency regulation service is the injection or
withdrawal of real power by facilities capable of responding
appropriately to a transmission system’s frequency deviations or
interchange power imbalance . . . .” 68
Maintaining the frequency of the transmission system within an
acceptable range is critical to reliable operations. When generation
dispatch does not equal actual load and losses on a moment-bymoment basis, the imbalance will result in the grid’s frequency
deviating from the standard (sixty Hertz). Minor frequency
deviations affect energy consuming devices; major deviations cause
generation and transmission equipment to separate from the grid, in
the worst case leading to a cascading blackout.

65. Melissa C. Lott, California Jail Transformed into Modern Microgrid, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN (June 19, 2012), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/2012/06/19/
california-jail-transforms-into-modern-microgrid/.
66. Michael Roach, Hurricane Sandy & the Emperor’s New Clothes: Microgrids as a
Risk Mitigation Strategy for Extreme Weather Events, MICROGRID HORIZONS 1, 13-14 (Dec.
13, 2012), http://mseia.net/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Roach_HurricaneSandyandthe
EmperorsNewClothes_2012_wRefs.doc.
67. DENHOLM ET AL., supra note 15, at 13.
68. Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets,
Order No. 755, 137 FERC ¶ 61,064, ¶ 4 (Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 755].
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“Frequency regulation service can help to prevent these adverse
consequences by rapidly correcting deviations in the transmission
system’s frequency to bring it within an acceptable range.” 69
Although fossil fuel generators have traditionally been used to
regulate or correct frequency deviations, energy storage can join
other emerging technologies like demand response to help provide
this service. 70 The faster a resource can ramp up or down,71 the more
accurately it can respond to the correction signal, which places these
emerging technologies at a distinct technological advantage over
fossil fuel generators. 72
2. Lower Costs
A second benefit of energy storage is its ability to reduce
electricity prices. Electricity prices vary depending on its time of use,
and prices are generally highest during “on-peak” periods, when the
majority of our population is awake and “plugged in.” 73 Where energy
storage can reduce the amount of peak electricity needed, costs are
projected to decrease. 74 Although these on-peak periods represent
only a small proportion of the total time electricity is needed,
resource planners cannot base their decisions on the average load.
Instead, energy resources are developed based on the peak loads.
Generation, transmission, and distribution systems also must be
sized for peak demand; as demand grows, new systems (both lines
and substations) must be installed, often only to meet the peak
demand for a few hours per year. Without wide scale energy storage,
these peak demands are addressed primarily through peaker power
69. See id. at 67,261.
70. Id. (“Provision by other resources is emerging, as technologies develop and tariff
and market rules [are appropriately] adapt[ed] to accommodate new resources. For
example, the Texas Interconnection and MISO currently use controllable demand response
in addition to generators to provide frequency regulation service.”).
71. “ ‘Ramping’ or the ability to ‘ramp’ is traditionally defined as the ability to change
the output of real power from a generating unit per some unit of time, usually measured as
megawatts per minute (MW/minute). A generator ramps up to produce more energy and
ramps down to produce less. A storage device ramps up by discharging energy and ramps
down by charging.” Id. at 67,260 n.3.
72. Id. at 67,265. But see discussion infra Part III.2.b. FERC has noted that current
compensation for frequency regulation services is inadequate to accommodate these new
resources like energy storage. Under the current compensation rules, slow-ramping and
fast-ramping resources are provided the same amount.
73. See, e.g., On-Peak & Off-Peak Hours, PACIFIC POWER, http://www.pacificpower.net/
ya/po/otou/ooh.html (last visited June 14, 2014).
74. Judith Judson McQueeney, Chair of the ESA Advocacy Council, Statement of the
Electricity Storage Association before the Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n 2 (Sept. 11,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20130911144647-Judson%20
Comments.pdf.
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plants. Peaker plants are those generators that are able to ramp up
and down rapidly to respond to a need from the grid operator.
Furthermore, peaker plants also bring with them significant capital
cost requirements, additional emissions, and usually a need to
construct additional transmission lines to connect to the existing
grid. Instead of building additional generation to satisfy peak loads,
energy can be generated and stored during off-peak periods and
discharged during peak periods to satisfy increased load.
In addition to ensuring adequate on-peak resources and reducing
or eliminating the need for peaking facilities, this type of action also
could reduce the need to construct additional transmission and
distribution lines. 75 New lines may be difficult or expensive to build,
often involving high capital costs and generating significant siting
controversy. These expenses and controversies can be avoided or
deferred by deploying energy storage located near the load.76
Bringing the energy storage closer to the source also may alleviate
the high line-loss rates that occur during peak demand. 77 Energy
storage may be able to reduce or eliminate some of these costs,
reducing rates for consumers. “Storage improves system efficiency
and return on investment (ROI) by shifting peak load to off-peak
hours and potentially reducing new investment in transmission
infrastructure – if the storage is properly located with respect to
transmission system constraints.” 78
3. Efficiency
A third benefit of energy storage lies in its ability to address
potential over-generation during off-peak periods. Under the current
constraints requiring instantaneous electricity use, significant
amounts of electricity are wasted. This waste occurs for a number of
reasons, including the generation of electricity during off-peak hours
without demand to satisfy the supply and constraints along
transmission lines. Renewable resources like wind, for instance, are
75. Michael Kanellos, Is Energy Storage a Product or Service, GREENTECH MEDIA
(Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/is-energy-storage-a-productor-service (“A 1.2-megawatt sodium sulfur storage facility in West Virginia commissioned
in 2006 trimmed peak power in the region by 10% to 15% and postponed the need to erect
another plant . . . .”).
76. ALI NOURAI, SANDIA NAT’L LABS., INSTALLATION OF THE FIRST DISTRIBUTED
ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM (DESS) AT AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER (AEP): A STUDY FOR THE
DOE
ENERGY
STORAGE
SYSTEMS
PROGRAM
13-14
(2007),
available
at
http://infoserve.sandia.gov/ sand_doc/2007/073580.pdf.
77. DENHOLM ET AL., supra note 15, at 12 (citing Ali Nourai et al., Load Leveling
Reduces T&D Line Losses, 23 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY 2168 (2008)).
78. DAN RASTLER, ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., MISO ENERGY STORAGE STUDY
PHASE I REPORT 3-1 (2011) [hereinafter MISO ENERGY STORAGE REPORT].
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generally strongest during winter, off-peak hours. This disconnect
between supply and demand can result in excess electricity that
could be captured through energy storage.
For example, the Bonneville Power Association (BPA) has been
faced with “too much of a good thing” with ample wind resources and
water flows for hydropower. Its transmission lines can only transmit
so much electricity, and this has forced the agency to choose between
providing wind or hydropower to the grid. Were BPA to allow the
excess water to spill over the dams, it would send hyper-oxygenated
water into the Columbia River’s vital salmon runs, subjecting it to
potential Clean Water Act violations. 79 Consequently, BPA agreed to
supply the power obligations of their thermal generators without
charge, a plan that was not as appealing to wind generators, who
were not concerned with saving fuel costs and were instead
concerned with generating wind to obtain the useful production tax
credits (PTCs) and Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) associated with
wind generation. 80 The dispute resulted in a FERC order requiring a
new BPA curtailment protocol in which BPA agreed to compensate
the wind generators for any PTC and unbundled RECs lost due to
non-generation. 81
Energy storage would have alleviated this problem, allowing for
the electricity generated from both wind and hydropower to
eventually make it to the grid. Additional energy storage would
minimize the curtailment of renewable energy during these times of
generator or transmission constraints, improve the capacity factors of
generators, and reduce the pressure on minimum load requirements
for conventional generators.82 Similar efforts to enhance the
efficiency of existing renewable generators can be seen in places like
New Jersey, where the legislature has recently proposed funding cuts
for renewables at the expense of increased funding for energy storage.83
79. See Iberdrola Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 137 FERC ¶ 61,185
(2011).
80. See id. at 4-5.
81. See Compliance Filing of the Bonneville Power Admin. at 26-27, Iberdrola
Renewables, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 137 FERC ¶ 61,185 (2011), No. EL11-44000.
82. Fossil fuel plants indicate a level below which they cannot easily ramp down
(often fifty percent). Renewable energy is therefore curtailed to prevent disruption of the
efficiency of the fossil fuel plants. “One of the major conclusions of wind integration studies
looking at higher penetrations is that minimum load points will need to be lowered
substantially below their current annual minimums.” DENHOLM ET AL, supra note 15, at
27-28.
83. Jeff Spross, New Jersey Wants to Boost Funding for Energy Storage Technology—
Here are Some Options, CLIMATEPROGRESS (Apr. 17, 2013, 11:00 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/04/17/1879471/new-jersey-wants-to-boost-fundingfor-energy-storage-technology-here-are-some-options/.
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4. Environmental
A fourth benefit of energy storage is found in the reduced
environmental impact that is realized by relying on more renewable
energy to supply our nation’s increasing electricity demand. Fossil
fuel combustion is the number one contributor of our nation’s
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as well as a number of other air
pollutants. 84 Renewable energy by itself is not interchangeable with
the baseload sources of fossil fuel energy like coal. Yet, by pairing
energy storage with renewable energy, it firms the renewable energy
generation, and may be able to displace some fossil fuel generators,
as well as avoid their corresponding GHG and pollution emissions. 85
More precisely, it could displace polluting peaker plants and the
ancillary services that are traditionally provided by fossil fuel
generators.86 “[L]arge-scale electricity storage promises [to] be an
energy game-changer, unshackling alternative energy from the
constraints of intermittence.” 87
The use of energy storage to provide energy services as opposed to
traditional fossil fuel generation will also minimize the market risks
associated with different primary fuel sources. 88 Natural gas looks
quite attractive at the present time, with vast shale discoveries and
84. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, supra note 11, at ES-6
(“The primary greenhouse gas emitted by human activities in the United States was CO2,
representing approximately 83.6 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions. The largest
source of CO2, and of overall greenhouse gas emissions, was fossil fuel combustion.”).
85. See, e.g., Exelon Wind 1, L.L.C. v. Smitherman, No. A-09-CA-917-SS, 2012 WL
4465607, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2012) (noting the PUCT indicated that a windgenerated power could be made firm by the use of energy storage techniques); Benjamin K.
Sovacool, Running on Empty: The Electricity-Water Nexus and the U.S. Electric Utility
Sector, 30 ENERGY L.J. 11, 37 (2009) (“Furthermore, attaching wind turbines to pumped
hydro and compressed air energy storage systems can improve their capacity factor to
above seventy percent, making them ‘functionally equivalent to a conventional baseload . . .
plant.’ ” (citation omitted)).
86. McQueeny, supra note 74, at 3 (“[One] MW of storage has the potential to offset
2-4 MWs of traditional fossil generation providing frequency regulation.”); Janice Lin &
Giovanni Damato, How Storage Can Help Get Rid of Peaker Plants, GREENTECH MEDIA
(June 28, 2010), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/energy-storage-vs.-peakers
(“[A]ssuming Pacific Gas and Electric’s base load electric mix as the off-peak source of
electricity, energy storage would provide 55% CO2 savings, 85% NOx savings, and up to
96% savings of CO per MWh of on-peak electricity delivered.”); see also LUONG, supra note
19, at 18 (“By using low-carbon energy storage, rather than resorting to flexible power
generators, such as fast-ramping coal and gas plants, electricity-related carbon emissions
are significantly reduced.”).
87. Luoma, supra note 45.
88. When “frequency regulation” services are needed, grid operators traditionally turn
to natural gas generators, capable of ramping up and down rapidly to regulate or correct
frequency deviations. Natural gas prices exhibit significantly more price volatility than
energy storage. See Low Natural Gas Prices Drive Fuel Shifts in the Electric Power Sector,
BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. fig. 3 (June 15, 2012), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/2012/06/lownatural-gas-prices-drive-fuel-shifts-electric-power-sector.
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low natural gas prices. But an adjustment of our energy economy
away from coal towards natural gas will result in a less diversified
supply than presently exists, increasing the risk of supply
disruptions due to future congestion in natural gas pipelines or
price increases.
C. Regulatory Uncertainty Surrounding Energy Storage
Despite these substantial benefits, energy storage still comprises a
mere two percent of the energy generated in the United States. 89 As
discussed above, although technical and financial uncertainty surely
play a role, stakeholders repeatedly point to regulatory uncertainty
as one of the primary barriers to energy storage’s further
deployment.90 This section analyzes the primary regulatory
uncertainty surrounding energy storage: FERC’s approach to energy
storage classification and the resulting inability of stakeholders to
predict the future state of the regulatory environment.
These classifications are important, because much of energy law is
premised on the labels provided to various energy transactions and
assets. The two primary regulatory uncertainties associated with
energy storage are (1) ambiguities about how to label the purchase
and sale of electricity coming in and out of an energy storage device,
resulting in jurisdictional uncertainty, and (2) ambiguities about how
to label the energy storage assets, resulting in cost recovery
uncertainty. The answers to these questions have substantial
jurisdictional and cost recovery implications for developers, as is
described below.
1. Jurisdictional Uncertainty
A first type of uncertainty is whether sales of power into and out
of an energy storage facility constitute wholesale or retail power.
The Federal Power Act (FPA) provides FERC with jurisdiction
over wholesale transactions but reserves the authority over
retail transactions to the states. Wholesale transactions are sales for
resale and would fall to FERC and competitive markets. Retail
transactions are sales to an end user and would fall to the states,
which use a mixture of regulated cost-of-service formulas and
restructured markets. 91
89. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 43, at 4 (“[T]he U.S. has about 24.6 GW
(approx. 2.3% of total electric production capacity) of grid storage, 95% of which is pumped
storage hydro.”).
90. See supra note 16.
91. What Is a Wholesale Electricity Market?, ELEC. POWER SUPPLY ASS’N,
http://www.epsa.org/industry/primer/?fa=wholesaleMarket (last visited June 14, 2014).
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FERC has consistently held that electricity coming in and out of
pumped storage hydropower facilities constitutes a wholesale
transaction that falls under FERC jurisdiction. 92 Similarly, the Texas
Public Utility Commission (PUC) has been involved in a complicated
jurisdictional question about whether the purchase and sale of
electricity coming in and out of an energy storage facility should be
treated as wholesale or retail transactions. Although Texas law
would have treated the electricity charged and discharged from an
energy storage facility as a retail sale, the Texas PUC made a special
amendment to their rules that allowed a large-scale battery storage
facility to pay wholesale rates when using electricity off the grid. 93
It is likely that there is not one answer to this uncertainty, given
that the answer depends where the facility is located and who is
managing it. For instance, the answer would differ depending on
whether it is a merchant generator or an Exempt Wholesale
Generator (EWG) selling into wholesale markets (wholesale
transactions), or whether the energy storage facility is located with a
utility for self-supply or supply directly to consumers (retail
transactions). 94 As a result, energy storage might support both retail
and wholesale markets, meaning it could be subject to both state and
federal regulators. Characterization of energy storage as generation
or transmission can even impact the ability to realize tax credits, as
was demonstrated by a recent private IRS ruling that allows a wind
farm to claim a thirty percent investment tax credit on energy
92. FERC has previously rejected classifying energy storage as “station power,”
resulting in a wholesale classification subject to FERC jurisdiction. Station power is used
for operating the electric equipment on the site of a generation facility or associated
buildings, and a station power designation renders the electricity used for that purpose a
retail transaction since the generating facility is then the end user. PJM Interconnection,
L.L.C., 132 FERC ¶ 61,203, slip op. at 2-3 (Sept. 3, 2010). FERC found that “[l]ike pumping
energy and compression energy, the energy used to charge Energy Storage Resources will
be stored for later delivery and not used for operating the electric equipment on the site of
a generation facility or associated buildings as Station Power is used.” Id. at 4.
93. Project Number 39917, DOE GLOBAL ENERGY STORAGE DATABASE, SANDIA NAT’L
LABS., http://www.energystorageexchange.org/policies/16 (last visited June 14, 2014) (“The
Commission recognized that a distinction of wholesale electrical load for storage devices
was reasonable where a storage device . . . takes power from the grid, converts it to
potential energy, and at a more opportune time transforms this potential energy back into
electric energy, which is returned to the grid . . . . Storage devices thus differ
fundamentally from other loads because the power taken from the grid is not
consumed . . . . In this respect, there is a clear distinction between storage assets and other
types of load when taking energy from the grid.”); see also Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Order
Adopting Amendments to § 25.192 and § 25.501 as Approved at the March 7, 2012 Open
Meeting
(Mar.
29,
2012),
available
at
http://www.puc.texas.gov/industry/
projects/rules/39917/39917adt.pdf.
94. See, e.g., Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n, supra note 93, at 2-12 (debating classification of
electricity sales as wholesale or retail depending upon the location and operator of the
energy storage facility).
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storage batteries in part because the device was not treated as
transmission equipment for regulatory purposes.95
2. Cost Recovery Uncertainty
A second type of uncertainty surrounds the difficulties of
classifying energy storage assets into a legal regime premised on
three traditional categories of assets: (1) generation, (2) transmission,
and (3) distribution. Traditional energy resources fit relatively neatly
into only one of these three categories, but energy storage is a
particularly sticky problem because of its ability to perform more
than one of these traditional energy functions. 96 In fact, it can
perform all three. 97 This causes regulators and developers
uncertainty about how the costs will be recovered, whether all of the
value streams associated with energy storage will be able to be
realized, and how to prevent double-counting associated with the cost
recovery for energy storage. The most notable source of contention is
whether energy storage constitutes a generation or a transmission
asset. This section is not intended to argue for one or the other.98
Instead, it analyzes the multi-functional nature of energy storage
technologies and provides a flavor for the resulting cost recovery
implications for these two classifications.
(a) Energy Storage as Generation
In one sense, energy storage is a generator of electricity.
Generation of electricity is defined as “[t]he process of producing
electric energy by transforming other forms of energy.” 99 Most energy
95. Chadbourne & Parke LLP, Is the US Independent Generator Model Dead?,
PROJECT FIN. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 2011, at 1, 1 (discussing IRS Private Letter Ruling
201142005), available at http://www.chadbourne.com/files/publication/d97f5fc1-1924-4ea690cd-48e96a8307f5/presentation/publicationattachment/6d7a694c-94c9-4e23-ae3a-4b411d00f
682/PFNewsWire_Nov11.pdf.
96. It is not the first time that the same facility could fall under two different
jurisdictions, depending on its function. Report of the Judicial Review Committee, 22
ENERGY L.J. 195, 206-07 (2001) (“The court affirmed the FERC’s two-pronged analysis of
its jurisdiction over local distribution facilities: (1) if the facilities are used to effect a sale
for resale in interstate commerce (wholesale sale), then the FERC has clear jurisdiction
over them; and (2) if the facilities are used for unbundled retail sales (retail wheeling),
then the FERC will use a seven-part functional test to determine whether the facilities are
transmission facilities (subject to the FERC’s jurisdiction) or local distribution facilities
(subject to state jurisdiction). The court held that the FERC’s two different statutory
grants of jurisdiction (sales for resale v. transmission in interstate commerce) justify this
differing treatment of what otherwise would be identical facilities.” (citing Transmission
Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2000))).
97. Id. at 206-08.
98. For analyses of the competing classifications, see LUONG, supra note 19.
99. Glossary, U.S., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/
glossary.html#gh (last visited June 14, 2014).
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storage technologies are not actually storing electricity, but are
storing the kinetic, potential, mechanical, or thermal energy and
converting that energy back to electricity at a specified time.
Technically, this process may be viewed as “generating” electricity.
The bulk storage of electricity, for example, if used by a utility to
time-shift the generation of electricity from a time of low-cost
generation, such as in the middle of the night, to a time of highcost generation, such as during peak use, would be seen as similar
to generation. 100

This practice would allow for energy arbitrage, where entities can
generate electricity when prices are low and hold the electricity until
prices are high. 101
On the other hand, some argue that an entity may only qualify as
a generator if it is providing a net increase of electricity into the
grid.102 In this sense, energy storage facilities are merely converters
of energy. Energy storage facilities use the energy from previously
generated electricity to convert it back to electricity at a prescribed
time. In so doing, they are providing no net increase in electricity
onto the grid and therefore should not be treated as a generator.103
Many different types of energy storage have already earned the
title of generation from FERC. The large, geographic-specific types of
energy storage, pumped-storage hydropower and CAES, are treated
as generation.104 FERC defines a pumped storage hydropower facility
as that which “stores and generates electricity” and regularly treats
it as such.105 FERC has even denied a pumped hydro storage
developer’s request to include their costs in transmission rates,
pointing out it would be discriminatory to roll the costs into
transmission rates when other pumped storage hydro owners
100. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DRAFT “ENERGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE” – ENERGY
STORAGE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, at 2-1 (2008), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/
files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/EAC_-_Storage_Subcommittee_9-22-08_rev_1.pdf.
101. M. KINTNER-MEYER ET AL., PAC. NW. NAT’L LAB., NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
ENERGY STORAGE FOR GRID BALANCING AND ARBITRAGE: PHASE 1, WECC, at 7.1 (2012),
available at http://energyenvironment.pnnl.gov/pdf/PNNL-21388_National_Assessment_
Storage _Phase_1_final.pdf.
102. Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n, supra note 93, at 5-6.
103. In fact, there may even be a net loss of energy, as some forms of energy storage
are quite inefficient. See, e.g., Pumped Storage Provides Grid Reliability Even with Net
Loss, supra note 15.
104. Pumped Storage Projects, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/
industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/pump-storage.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2014);
CAES, POWERSOUTH ENERGY COOPERATIVE, http://www.powersouth.com/mcintosh_
power_plant/compressed_air_energy (last visited June 14, 2014).
105. Pumped Storage Projects, supra note 104; see also Norton Energy Storage, L.L.C.,
95 FERC ¶ 61,476, at 5-6 (2001).
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collected revenues as other forms of generation—only by succeeding
in the wholesale power markets. 106
Some state regulators have also embraced energy storage as
generation. New York is treating a proposed CAES facility as a
“generation facility.” 107 The Seneca Compressed Air Energy Storage
Project would be linked with a 115 kilovolts (kV) transmission
system, which currently serves generators powered by fossil fuels,
small hydro, and wind farms.108 CAES is regularly referred to as a
generator, including in scholarly treatises 109 and patents filed with
the U.S. Patent Office.110 Texas similarly treats CAES as generation
but has also extended the generation logic to smaller-scale energy
storage. In 2011, it passed a landmark bill that defines energy
storage, including batteries and flywheels, as generation when
offering services on the competitive market employed in that state. 111
In further support of energy storage as generation, many states
that have passed renewable portfolio standards (RPS), which require
utilities to procure a certain amount of their electricity generation
from renewables, also include energy storage as an eligible
“source.” 112 Many of these RPS only allow energy storage to be used if
106. Nevada Hydro Co., 122 FERC ¶ 61,272, at 32-33 (2008).
107. See WORLEYPARSONS, NEW YORK STATE ELECTRIC AND GAS: SENECA COMPRESSED
AIR ENERGY STORAGE PROJECT – TRANSMISSION IMPACT STUDY 1 (2011).
108. Id.
109. Saifur Rahman, Advanced Technology, in ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION,
TRANSMISSION, AND DISTRIBUTION 3.2 (2012) (“[C]ompressed gas is combusted in the
turbine to produce electricity . . . and then operate[s] as a generator.”); Laurence D. Kirsch,
Compensating Electrical Storage Resources, ELEC. J., May 2011, at 72, 73.
110. U.S. Patent No. 20110094212 A1, at [0003] (filed Oct. 28, 2009) (“In this scheme,
the [CAES system] functions as a generator, providing power to a power grid, for
example.”).
111. Tex. Bus. & Com. Bill Analysis, S.B. 943, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011),
available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/82R/analysis/html/SB00943F.htm.
112. ASHLEY JOHNSON, NAT’L HYDROPOWER ASS’N, STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARD REPORT 53 (2011) (noting Pennsylvania allows pumped hydro); CINDY LASH,
KANSAS LEGISLATOR BRIEFING BOOK 2013: ENERGY AND UTILITIES 1, 2 (2013) (noting
Kansas allows compressed air energy storage); Beacon Power, Response to the New York
Energy Highway Request for Information (RFI) 7-8 (May 30, 2012) (noting New York
classifies energy storage as “alternative energy production,” and is considering adding
flywheels to its list of energy storage devices eligible for inclusion in the RPS); Montana
Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_
Code=MT11R (last updated July 24, 2013) (noting Montana allows compressed air energy
storage); Ohio Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, DATABASE OF STATE
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY,
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/
incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=OH14R (last updated Nov. 8, 2012) (noting Ohio Senate Bill
221 would categorize storage that improves utilization of renewable resources during offpeak hours as a “Renewable Energy Resource”); Clean Energy States Alliance (CESA),
Energy Storage in State RPSs (Dec. 19, 2011) (Webinar presentation),
http://www.sandia.gov/ess/docs/conferences/Dec_19_RPS_and_Energy_Storage_Combined_
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the electricity input into the storage device originated from a
renewable source. 113 In California, only pumped-storage hydroelectric
(a traditional renewable source) and “fuel cells using a renewable
fuel” qualify for the state’s RPS, 114 and some local districts, such as
the Truckee Donner Public Utility District, require that energy
storage projects be sourced from renewable generators.115
Massachusetts’s RPS qualifies energy storage facilities only if they
store “useful thermal energy,” or basically heat energy that would
have otherwise been wasted in electricity generation, transmission,
and distribution.116 Utah has proposed allowing compressed air
energy storage only if the electricity compressing the air was
produced using a renewable source or with a renewable energy
credit. 117 Hawaii’s limited energy storage integration excludes energy
from fossil fuel facilities. 118 Finally, Michigan’s RPS includes energy
generated by renewable sources that is kept for later transmission in
a storage facility. 119
The label of generator has both jurisdictional and cost recovery
implications. First, as noted above, the Federal Power Act provides
states with jurisdiction over “facilities used for the generation of
electric energy.” 120 Being classified as a generator also allows the
Slides.pdf (noting Delaware allows fuel cells). But cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2 (2013)
(“ ‘Renewable energy’ shall not include electricity generated from pumped storage, but
shall include run-of-river generation from a combined pumped-storage and run-of-river
facility.”).
113. This is consistent with FERC’s rejection of energy storage as a “Qualified Facility
(QF)” under PURPA where there was no demonstration that the amount of power provided
came from sufficient “renewable resources.” Luz Dev. & Fin. Corp., 51 FERC ¶ 61,078, at 5
(1990). “[E]nergy storage facilities such as the proposed Luz battery system are a
renewable resource for purposes of QF certification. However, such facilities are subject to
the requirement that the energy input to the facility is itself biomass, waste, a renewable
resource, a geothermal resource, or any combination thereof or a demonstration that any
fossil fuel-fired input constitutes no more than 25 percent of the total energy input to the
facility and such uses are consistent with those enumerated in section 3(17)(B) of the FPA.”
Id. at 9-10.
114. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD ELIGIBILITY 8 (4th ed.
2011).
115. TRUCKEE DONNER PUB. UTIL. DIST., RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES
PROCUREMENT PLAN 5 (2013).
116. 225 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.05(2) (2008).
117. S.B. 104, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010).
118. HAW. REV. STAT. § 269-91 (2003).
119. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.1001 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.1039(c) (2008);
MUHSIN ABDURRAHMAN ET AL., ENERGY STORAGE AS A TRANSMISSION ASSET 4 (2012),
available at http://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/advanced-tech-pilots/xtreme-powerstorage-as-transmission.ashx.
120. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). However, The Supreme Court has upheld FERC
authority over generating facilities, so long as the regulated activity can be characterized
as “the sale of power created by that facility.” Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy,
Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of
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energy storage facility to have the same status and benefits
associated with facilitating interconnection with the grid. 121 Second,
and perhaps more importantly, by designating energy storage as
generation, the provider commits to participation in a complicated
cost recovery regime.
At the wholesale level, FERC continues to foster competition and
monitor generators and marketers that charge market-based rates to
ensure that they do not have market power or engage in prohibited
behavior.122 Wholesale markets exhibit regional differences, with
two-thirds of the country operated by sophisticated regional markets
and one-third of the country operated by individual entities. Twothirds of the country is operated by seven regional transmission
operators or independent system operators (RTO-ISOs), 123 which
operate highly organized wholesale markets in which the energy
resources are bid and dispatched in hourly and daily auctions.
Although the availability and rules applicable to these markets
differs by the seven RTO-ISOs,124 an energy storage facility will
recoup its cost through bidding into one or more of the three relevant

the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507, 615-16 (2004); see also Miss.
Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 382-83 (1988). Although section
201(b) of the FPA denies FERC jurisdiction “over facilities used for the generation of
electric energy,” that provision does not necessarily prevent FERC from including costs
relating to generating facilities in transmission rates, over which FERC indisputably has
jurisdiction. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). This is so because this part of section 201(b) is
modified by the phrase “except as specifically provided in this subchapter and subchapter
III of this chapter.” Id. Given that section 201(a) grants FERC jurisdiction over “the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce” and, therefore, over transmission
rates, Id. § 824(a), FERC may exercise jurisdiction over generation facilities to the extent
necessary to regulate interstate transmission.’ ” Id.
121. See Roberts, supra note 49, at 46, 48-49.
122. See 16 U.S.C. § 824s(d) (2012). FERC also established rules that allowed for
market-based prices to satisfy the “just and reasonable” standard that Congress had
imposed upon it. Id.
123. The seven RTOs are CAISO, ERCOT, SPP, MISO, PJM, NYISO, and ISO-NE.
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FERC,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Apr. 2, 2014); see also
The Role of ISOs and RTOs, IRC RTO/ISO COUNCIL, http://www.isorto.org/about/Role (last
visited June 14, 2014) (RTOs and ISOs serve two-thirds of electricity consumers in the
United States).
124. RTOs may distinguish the availability of various markets based on whether the
energy storage technology can function in the long-term or the short-term. For instance,
“MISO currently accommodates long-term storage resources in its markets in the form of
pumped hydro storage (PHS).” MISO ENERGY STORAGE REPORT, supra note 78, at 1-2.
“Short-term storage is accommodated as a regulating reserve resource in the MISO
ancillary services market (ASM).” Id. at v. The Southwest Power Pool operates a market
design that combines a day-ahead market with unit commitment and a co-optimized
energy and ancillary services markets. See About The Marketplace, SW. POWER POOL,
http://www.spp.org/section.asp?pageid=143 (last visited June 14, 2014).
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markets: (1) energy,125 (2) capacity,126 and (3) ancillary services.127 In
non-RTO jurisdictions, individual, non-regionalized transmission
owners “base trades exclusively on bilateral sales negotiated directly
between suppliers.” 128
At the retail level, the United States is divided into a mixture of
traditional cost-of service (regulated) jurisdictions and restructured
(competitive) jurisdictions. 129 In cost-of-service jurisdictions, the
utilities remain vertically integrated, meaning the utility owns the
generation, transmission, and distribution facilities servicing the
area. In these jurisdictions, a PUC approves the rates that utilities
can charge their customers based on a rate base multiplied by a rate
of return, then adding operation and maintenance costs,
administrative and general expenses, depreciation, income and nonincome taxes, minus revenue credits. 130 Due to the multiplier effect
applied to the rate base, an important factor in such determinations
is whether a particular asset would be included in the utility’s base
rate, receiving the benefit of a multiplier effect, whether the costs can
only be included as a pass-through charge without the multiplier
effect, or whether only partial costs of the energy storage will be
allowed.131 Without such clarification, investors may be unwilling to
invest as large an amount of up-front capital. In these areas, “the role
of power markets is limited to wholesale purchases or sales of power,
125. Energy markets establish a market clearing price for the electricity that balances
load and generation at designated points on the transmission system.
126. Capacity markets provide payments to generators to ensure that sufficient
capacity is built and maintained to serve system peak loads. Three of the seven RTO/ISOs
have functioning capacity markets (PJM, NYISO and ISO-NE).
127. Ancillary services are specialized energy and capacity services that allow the ISO
to operate the transmission grid and to respond to unanticipated contingencies such as the
loss of a generator or transmission line. Glossary and Acronyms, ISO NEW ENGLAND,
http://www.iso-ne.com/support/training/glossary/ (last visited June 14, 2014) (Ancillary
markets facilitate transfer of those “services that support electricity transmission and
reliable operations of the grid, such as load regulation, spinning reserve, non-spinning
reserve, replacement reserve, and voltage support” and are only beginning to emerge as
renewables gain traction in the markets). AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF
THE SIX REGIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATIONS (RTOS) 1 (2012) (In regions with
operating RTOs or ISOs, “market participants buy and sell a variety of electricity products
and services,” which has facilitated the creation of markets for electricity, capacity, and
ancillary services).
128. ELEC. ENERGY MKT. COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY 3 (n.d.),
available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf.
129. Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept.
2010), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/.
130. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 18, at 6-7.
131. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITY COST REPORT 10 (2012),
available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/1C5DC9A9-3440-43EA-9C61-065FAD1
FD111/0/AB67CostReport201.pdf.
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which utilities undertake to supplement their cost-based generation
activities. These wholesale power transactions contribute to but are
generally not needed to allow regulated utilities to recover capacityrelated costs.” 132
In restructured regions where there is retail competition, however,
utilities are no longer vertically integrated, and generating facilities
need to operate on a “merchant” basis.133 These generating facilities
no longer recover costs through cost-of-service rates, but “through
market-based (short- or long-term) bilateral contracts or spot market
sales” in energy, ancillary, and capacity markets, where available. 134
(b) Energy Storage as Transmission
In another sense, energy storage can be considered a transmission
asset. Transmission assets aid in the reliability of the grid, provide
voltage support, frequency regulation, and other load leveling
functions. 135 As discussed supra in Part II.B, energy storage can be a
critical asset for providing exactly these functions, leading some to
argue that it should be classified as such. As with a generation label,
a transmission label carries with it jurisdictional and cost recovery
implications—namely FERC jurisdiction and recovery under FERCapproved rates.
132. JOHANNES PFEIFENBERGER ET AL., A COMPARISON OF PJM’S RPM WITH
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY AND CAPACITY MARKET DESIGNS 13 (2009), available at
http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/004/859/original/A_Comparison_of_PJ
M’s_RPM_with_Alt_Energy_and_Capacity_Mkt_Designs_Pfeifenberger_et_al_Sep_2009.pd
f?1379014789.
133. Id. In states that allow competition, the PUC still regulates distribution wires and
oversees structured programs for competitive electric energy suppliers. REGULATORY
ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 27-28 (2011),
available at www.raponline.org/documents/download.id/. In addition, some restructured
state programs require incumbent utilities to provide energy service at regulated rates to
customers as a default provider. See, e.g., BARBARA R. ALEXANDER, THE TRANSITION TO
RETAIL COMPETITION IN ENERGY MARKETS: HOW HAVE RESIDENTIAL CONSUMERS FARED?
PART ONE: AN ANALYSIS OF RESIDENTIAL ENERGY MARKETS IN GEORGIA, MASSACHUSETTS,
OHIO, NEW YORK AND TEXAS 30 (2002) (noting the retention of incumbent utilities as
Default Service providers in Ohio’s retail electric restructuring program); see also BARBARA
R. ALEXANDER, DEFAULT SERVICE FOR RETAIL ELECTRIC COMPETITION: CAN RESIDENTIAL
AND LOW INCOME CUSTOMERS BE PROTECTED WHEN THE EXPERIMENT GOES AWRY? 3
(2002) (“[E]very state that has adopted electric restructuring has provided [Default
Service]. . . . [It] is viewed as a regulated service . . . in every state and its price, and terms
and conditions are subject to regulation by the state regulator of electric utilities.”).
134. PFEIFENBERGER, supra note 132, at 13.
135. ABDURRAHMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 3; see also DHRUV BHATNAGAR & VERNE
LOOSE, EVALUATING UTILITY PROCURED ELECTRIC ENERGY STORAGE RESOURCES: A
PERSPECTIVE FOR STATE ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATORS 25-27, 37 (2012), available at
http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/SAND2012-9422.pdf (discussing the different
definitions and classifications of energy storage and explaining that FERC assesses the
classification of energy storage devices on a case-by-case basis).
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Using its authority under the FPA, FERC had previously
embarked on a series of rulemakings to realize the benefits of
enhanced competition. It required unbundling of historically
vertically integrated utilities into separate generation, transmission,
and distribution facilities in restructured areas. 136 As discussed
previously, FERC created wholesale markets for generators and only
retained control over those aspects of the utility industry at risk
of monopolistic behavior, namely transmission assets. 137 FERC
established transmission tariffs that require open and nondiscriminatory rates and service for all generators. 138 FERC tariffs
determine how much money transmission system owners can earn
from their transmission system, determine the structure of the
transmission rates, and often determine who pays for upgrades to the
transmission system.139
In 2005, Congress amended the FPA by adding § 219, directing
FERC to develop incentive-based rate treatments for transmission
“for the purpose of benefiting consumers by ensuring reliability and
reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission
congestion.” 140 Congress also expressly made clear that energy
storage was an “advanced transmission technology” eligible for
incentive-based rate treatment, and directed FERC to encourage
these technologies “as appropriate.” 141 The amendment defined an
“advanced transmission technology” as that which “increases the

136. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities
and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter
FERC Order No. 888].
137. Id.; see also David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 765, 774 (2008) (discussing the history of unbundling of U.S. electricity
markets).
138. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order
No. 890-C, 126 FERC ¶ 61,228 (Mar. 19, 2009) (This “Order on Rehearing and
Clarification” codified FERC Order No. 890 and supplemented Order Nos. 888 and 889 in
order to clarify “certain revisions to its regulations and the pro forma open-access
transmission tariff, or OATT, adopted in Order Nos. 888 and 889 to ensure that
transmission services are provided on a basis that is just, reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory” and to increase transparency in the rules applicable to planning and use of
the transmission system.); see also FERC Order No. 888, supra note 136.
139. MATTHEW H. BROWN & RICHARD P. SEDANO, NAT’L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY,
ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION: A PRIMER 55 (2004), available at http://www.puc.nh.gov/
Transmission%20Commission/Transmission %20Infrastructure/Appendix%20A.pdf.
140. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 219, 16 U.S.C. § 824s(a) (Supp. 2005).
141. Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 1223-24, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16422-23 (Supp. 2005)
(including pumped hydro, compressed air, superconducting magnetic energy storage,
flywheels, and batteries); Promoting Transmission Investment Through Pricing Reform,
Order No. 679, 116 FERC ¶ 61,057 (July 20, 2006) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 679].
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capacity, efficiency, or reliability of an existing or new transmission
facility, including . . . energy storage devices.” 142
FERC complied with this directive in 2006 with Order No. 679,
which embraced a more flexible approach to transmission rates. It
allows “any transmitting utility or electric utility transmitting
electric energy in interstate commerce that joins a Transmission
Organization” to be eligible for incentive-based rate treatments. 143
FERC stated:
Thus, for the Nation to be able to integrate the next generation of
resources, we must encourage investors to take the risks
associated with constructing large new transmission projects that
can integrate new generation and otherwise reduce congestion and
increase reliability. Our policies also must encourage all other
needed transmission investments, whether they are regional or
local, designed to improve reliability or to lower the delivered cost
of power. 144

Many types of energy storage qualify as “other needed
transmission investments . . . designed to improve reliability or to
lower the delivered cost of power.” 145 In its final rule on incentivebased rates, FERC expressly embraced advanced transmission
technologies like energy storage as being “illustrative of the kinds of
technologies that Congress sought to encourage . . . that may be
employed and considered for incentive ratemaking treatment.” 146
The label of an “advanced transmission technology” is far from
dispositive as to its asset classification, however, as is evidenced
from FERC’s treatment of a California pumped storage hydro
facility. 147 Even though FERC acknowledged that the 500 MW Lake
Elsinore Advance Pumped Storage (LEAPS) project was an
“advanced transmission technolog[y]” under the 2005 Energy Policy

142. 42 U.S.C. § 16422(a)(11) (Supp. 2005).
143. FERC Order No. 679, supra note 141, ¶ 4.
144. Id. ¶ 25.
145. Id.
146. Id. ¶ 290.
147. The other relevant analysis would be to determine whether the energy storage
entity seeking to take advantage of these rate incentives is a public utility, a question that
turns on whether the entity is selling electric energy. 16 U.S.C. § 796(22) (Supp. 2005) (The
Federal Power Act defines an electric utility as “a person or State agency (including [any
municipality]) that sells electric energy. The term ‘electric utility’ includes the Tennessee
Valley Authority and each Federal power marketing administration.”). Although this may
not be a substantial issue for many energy storage developers because utilities are
developing many of them, it may be particularly relevant for merchant energy storage
facilities seeking to compete on a level playing field with incumbent utilities.
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Act (EPAct), 148 it declined to treat the facility as a transmission asset
to be included in the CAISO Transmission Access Charge,149 saying it
cannot support treating LEAPS differently than existing, similar
generating units.150 But this Congressional amendment and
subsequent FERC rulemakings mean that if energy storage is
designated as transmission, it may be a FERC jurisdictional facility
subject to transmission tariffs and eligible for market incentives.151 A
transmission designation will also involve it in critical forthcoming
transmission planning required by FERC’s recent Order No. 1000,
which requires transmission providers to consider transmission
needs driven by public policy requirements established by state or
federal laws or regulations. 152 As will be discussed infra, some states
are already including energy storage into such “public policy
requirements.”
Importantly, the label of transmission asset can also serve to limit
the energy storage facility, both in terms of access to markets and
ownership. First, if energy storage is treated as a transmission asset,
market rules prohibit it from participating in wholesale energy and
ancillary service markets, markets that have historically been served
by generators to “maintain the independence of grid operators and
avoid the potential for market manipulation, whether real or

148. Nevada Hydro Co., Order on Rate Request, FERC Doc. Nos. ER06-278-000 to -004,
at 12 (Nov. 17, 2006), available at http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/111606/E5.pdf.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 5-6. Complicating matters was the fact that developers proposed to retain
ownership of the facility but cede operational control to the transmission operator (in this
case CAISO) and rely primarily on transmission system rights provided through
transmission tariffs for their compensation). Id. at 3. Many rejected this proposal as
presenting a conflict of interest for the ISO that was charged with neutrality as grid
operator, including CAISO and FERC. Nevada Hydro Co., Order on Rate Incentives and
Compliance Filings, 122 FERC ¶ 61,272, ¶¶ 59-63 (2008). In these systems, the RTOs and
ISOs do not own any of the generation or transmission assets, but develop the rules to
administer the markets, decide which generators will run at what levels, provide the
transmission services needed for transactions to occur, and run the billing systems for
payments for power. ROBERT H. SCHULTE ET AL., LESSONS FROM IOWA: DEVELOPMENT OF A
270 MEGAWATT COMPRESSED AIR ENERGY STORAGE PROJECT IN MIDWEST INDEPENDENT
SYSTEM OPERATOR: A STUDY FOR THE DOE ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS PROGRAM 79 (2012),
available at http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/120388.pdf.
151. BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 139, at 53 (“If the transmission facilities fall under
federal jurisdiction, [however,] the state commission generally must allow the utility to
include its transmission costs in [its] rates.”).
152. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 (July 21, 2011) (requiring
each public utility transmission provider to participate in a regional transmission planning
process that produces a regional transmission plan) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 1000].
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perceived.” 153 Second, this asset classification may also have
implications for ownership of the energy storage facility. For
instance, in restructured regimes, the law requires utilities to divest
their generation from their transmission and distribution,154 as is
evidenced by ERCOT’s retail choice areas, where “a company cannot
own both generation and transmission/distribution, except through
separate affiliates under stringent code of conduct restrictions.” 155
The American Physical Society similarly concluded that “the ability
of energy storage technologies to “cross traditional boundaries of
generation, transmission and distribution . . . [p]aradoxically . . .
could restrict its deployment [ ] due to the limitations placed
on ownership.” 156
Regulators are starting to make these classification
determinations with respect to energy storage that performs only one
function. For instance, both the Wisconsin and Texas PUCs have
approved energy storage projects that serve transmission
functions. 157 In both cases, the PUCs made sure to prohibit doublecounting, allowing the provider to recover transmission rates, but not
participate in wholesale markets.158 Yet it is unclear how they will
treat an energy storage facility that performs multiple functions.
Energy storage developers may find themselves in a catch-22
153. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 34, at 11-12 (“Furthermore, FERC
requires market power studies to be performed when third parties provide ancillary
services at market-based rates to transmission providers . . . .”).
154. See Paul L. Joskow, Transmission Policy in the United States, 13 UTILS. POL. 95,
96 (2005).
155. ELIZABETH DREWS, REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPACTS INVOLVING
ELECTRICITY STORAGE IN TEXAS 5 (2012).
156. AM. PHYSICAL SOC., CHALLENGES OF ELECTRICITY STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES 18
(2007).
157. See Roberts, supra note 55, at 48-49 (discussing the Rhinelander Loop and the
Sodium-Sulfur battery installed in Presidio, Texas); ABDURRAHMAN ET AL., supra note 119,
at 3. The Texas PUC approved its classification as a transmission asset subject to the
company’s regulated cost of service transmission rates. Order Approving Application of
Electric Transmission Texas, LLC for Regulatory Approvals Related to Installation of a
Sodium Sulfur Battery at Presidio, Tex., No. 35944 (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n 2009)
[hereinafter Order Approving Electric Transmission’s Application, available at
http://interchange.puc.state.tx.us/WebApp/Interchange/Documents/35994_114_613205.PDf;
Application of Electric Transmission Texas, LLC for Regulatory Approvals Related to
Installation of a Sodium Sulfer Battery at Presidio, Tex., No. 35994 (Tex. Pub. Util.
Comm’n
2008),
available
at
http://interchange.puc.state.tx.us/WebApp/
Interchange/Documents/ 35994_1_592495.PDF.
158. See Order Approving Electric Transmission’s Application, supra note 157, at 11
(stipulating that the battery storage project at issue was correctly classified as a
transmission asset alone, and not a generating facility capable of competing in wholesale
markets, because “the . . . battery is a reactive device” that “does not generate electric
power by converting another source of energy . . . into electricity,” but rather its “source of
energy is power from the electric grid from which it stores and to which it later
discharges”).
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situation, since policymakers argue that for energy storage to reach
its full market potential, its multiple functions all along the value
stream need to be recognized.159 At the same time, employing
multiple functions may generate more controversy and opposition to
the project for fear of double-counting through both cost-based rate
treatment and market-based rate treatment. The American Public
Power Association, whose members are often wholesale customers of
public utilities taking service under FERC-regulated wholesale and
transmission rates, argued that storage projects “should not be able
to recover their full costs of service through cost-based rates and then
earn additional revenues through sales in other markets that are
pocketed by project participants.” 160 Opponents also argue that
improperly characterizing energy storage as transmission is a backdoor attempt to socialize the fixed costs of generation.161
David Pomper has argued that FERC exercises jurisdiction over
energy storage on the basis of its transmission services as opposed to
wholesale transaction authority. 162 He subscribes to longstanding
jurisprudence about the bounds of transmission services, describing
transmission as extending from where generation is complete to
where the energy is subdivided to serve ultimate consumers. 163 Under
this interpretation, FERC would have jurisdiction over all the
functions of energy storage, a result that might not occur if FERC
exerted its jurisdiction based on whether the electricity entering or
159. Dhruv Bhatnagar, Sandia Nat’l Labs., Regulatory Challenges to the Integration of
Energy Storage 4 (2013) (Powerpoint presentation) (identifying “functional classification
restrictions” (“[b]lurring of the line between [asset] classifications”) as a challenge to
energy storage and suggesting that “clarity and transparency in procedures to allow
revenue recovery under multiple classifications” could serve as a solution). Additionally,
without an apples to apples costs and benefits comparison, an energy storage project may
not look cost-effective next to a new peaking generation facility or transmission line.
160. Jeannine Anderson, Rates to Pay for Energy Storage Devices Should Not Allow
Cross-subsidization, APPA tells FERC, PUB. POWER DAILY (Aug. 20, 2010) (internal
quotation
marks
omitted),
http://www.naylornetwork.com/app-ppd/articles/indexv2.asp?aid=12 4398&issueID=22651. The American Public Power Association also argued
that “[s]haring costs of energy storage facilities between retail and wholesale rates could
open the door to cross-subsidization of a utility’s retail customers by its wholesale
customers . . . .” Id.
161. See, e.g., Brief of The Nevada Hydro Company in Response to the Administrative
Law Judge’s Ruling Establishing Date for Service of Supplemental Testimony and Setting
Briefing Dates Dated October 6, 2010, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, App. No. 10-07-001, at 19
(Nov. 19, 2010), http://fronlinesonline.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/tnhc-initial-briefrevised-december-11.pdf (“The intervenor compensation program socializes the intervenor’s
costs among the utility’s ratepayers.”); Nevada Hydro Co., Order on Rate Request, supra
note 148, at 9.
162. David E. Pomper, Pausing the Speed of Light: Rethinking the Basis for Federal
Jurisdiction over Storage Services, ELECTRICPOLICY.COM 7-8 (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.spiegelmcd.com/files/Pomper_merged_ 2011_11_15_02_26_56.pdf.
163. Id. at 7.
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exiting the storage facility is wholesale or retail. 164 Pomper also
argues that the jurisdictional and cost recovery aspects are not
necessarily linked, providing an example of jurisdictional
transmission facilities that have their cost allocated to generation
customers or markets. 165 In fact, Pomper goes as far as to argue that
we should “recognize that storage is a form of transmission that,
generally, should be regulated like generation.” 166
In sum, cost recovery turns primarily on whether the energy
storage facilities are labeled as generation, transmission, or
distribution facilities. Generators are able to bid their electricity and
sometimes their ancillary and capacity services into wholesale
markets. 167 Transmission operators, however, are subject to FERCregulated rates through established tariffs.168 To further complicate
matters, some energy storage developers would not want to be
pigeon-holed into one asset category or the other. In fact, some forms
of energy storage will only be cost-effective if they can realize all of
the benefits that energy storage can provide, benefits that spread
across all three of these asset categories.169 For energy storage to
maximize its value, however, it may be necessary for energy storage
developers to seek cost recovery in both regulated cost-of-service and
market-based regimes, subjecting it to both state and federal
jurisdiction. The result can be both jurisdictional struggles of overlap
and gaps, as well as risks of double-counting and inadequate
compensation.
III. CHARACTERIZING THE REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY
Significant organizational theory literature exploring regulatory
uncertainty exists. These scholars have spent decades defining
uncertainty, 170 differentiating various types of uncertainty,171 and
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Market Products and Services Help Meet Demand, CAL. INDEP. SYS.
OPERATOR, http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/ProductsServices/Default.aspx (last visited
June 14, 2014) (explaining that “[s]cheduling coordinators can offer energy into the market
from generating units” and “may participate in the ancillary services market”).
168. REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE
67 (2011), available at http://www.raponline.org/docs/RAP_Lazar_ElectricityRegulationIn
TheUS_Guide_2011_03.pdf.
169. See EYER & COREY, supra note 29, at 18-21 (listing out seventeen applications for
energy storage).
170. See, e.g., Milliken, supra note 17, at 134, 136 (citing different definitions of
“environmental uncertainty,” meaning external to the organization, not environmental of
the natural world variety).
171. See, e.g., Hugh Courtney, Jane Kirkland & Patrick Viguerie, Strategy Under
Uncertainty, HARVARD BUS. REV., Nov. 1997, at 67, 68-71 (differentiating based on four
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assessing organizational strategic responses to such uncertainty.172
Of these efforts, only a subset addresses regulatory uncertainty
specifically, and few, if any, identify criteria that are helpful in
distinguishing between the different degrees of regulatory
uncertainty that exist. 173 This Part embarks on this mission—to
begin a framework for characterizing different degrees (as opposed to
types) of uncertainty. By degree, it means the relative state of the
uncertainty, along a spectrum, that suggests that all regulatory
uncertainty is not created equal. To do this, this Part uses the
uncertainty associated with energy storage to identify factors that
are important to assessing the degree of uncertainty.
Uncertainty runs the risk of alienating energy storage developers
and impeding the deployment of the affected technologies. 174 The
most common reaction to such uncertainty is one of risk avoidance.
This is understandable, as predictability is one of the cornerstones of
the rule of law, providing stability and certainty for the regulated
community.175 The risk averse nature of humans further contributes

possible futures); Milliken, supra note 17, at 135-36 (differentiating perceived uncertainty
into three types: state, effect, and response uncertainty); Birger Wernerfelt & Aneel
Karnani, Competitive Strategy Under Uncertainty, 8 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 187, 189 (1987)
(differentiating based on demand structure, supply structure, and competitors and
externalities).
172. Christian Engau & Volker H. Hoffmann, Strategizing in an Unpredictable
Climate: Exploring Corporate Strategies to Cope with Regulatory Uncertainty, 44 LONG
RANGE PLAN. 42 (2011); Volker H. Hoffmann et al., Regulatory Uncertainty: A Reason to
Postpone Investments? Not Necessarily, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 1227, 1227-29 (2009).
173. As Hoffman identifies, some scholars like Miles and Snow do distinguish between
types of regulation (tax versus regulation, price setting versus product standards), but not
to the level of detail at which this Article addresses uncertainty. Hoffmann et al., supra
note 172, at 1237. Hoffman’s differentiation may be one of the closer characterizations of
degree than type. Volker H. Hoffmann et al., A Taxonomy for Regulatory Uncertainty—
Application to the European Emission Trading Scheme, 11 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 712, 712-13
(2008) (differentiating within one specific regulation based on basic direction, measures
and rules, implementation process, and interdependence); Hoffman et al., supra note 172,
at 1237 (differentiating based on current implementation, medium-term measures and
rules, and long-term political direction); see also Guy L.F. Holburn, Assessing and
Managing Regulatory Risk in Renewable Energy: Contrasts between Canada and the
United States, 45 ENERGY POL’Y 654 (2012) (focusing on regulatory risks as opposed to
regulatory uncertainty, but arguing that regulatory risks are lower in jurisdictions where
regulatory agencies have greater autonomy and rigid policy-making processes).
174. See, e.g., AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2006 (“The Commission
has noted on several occasions that regulatory uncertainty can discourage investment, and
so unnecessary regulatory uncertainty should be avoided.” (quoting In re Amendment of
the Comm’n’s Space Station Licensing Rules & Policies, 18 FCC Rcd. 10,760, 10,781 ¶ 45
n.115 (2003))).
175. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 13,563, 13,563 (2011) (Our regulatory
system “must promote predictability and reduce uncertainty.”); Kathryn A. Watts,
Regulatory Moratoria, 61 DUKE L.J. 1883, 1922 (2012) (“[Nevada] Governor Sandoval
asserted that ‘stable, consistent and predictable common sense regulation is vital to

732

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:697

to a desire for certainty. 176 A wealth of literature supports the
common sense notion that firms are less willing to invest where the
returns are uncertain. 177 Firms that cannot accurately predict future
regulatory conditions are naturally more hesitant to invest
significant amounts of capital. As has been noted in judicial
proceedings, “[t]he general proposition that uncertainty about
regulatory requirements affects market value is so intuitively
obvious as to require no expert support.” 178 Such reluctance to invest
also can stifle innovation. 179 “Regulatory uncertainty directly impacts
innovation by hampering investment, and, therefore decreasing the
amount of available capital that can be used for research and
development.” 180 Not surprisingly, therefore, uncertainty often is

maintaining a regulatory environment that both secures the people and businesses of the
state of Nevada and fosters economic growth.’ ” (citation omitted)).
176. Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 908 (2011) (“People are often risk
averse—that is, they prefer not to gamble.”); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming
Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 562, 588 (1992) (“When substantial risk is involved, most people are risk averse: they
tend to avoid gambles that pose the chance of catastrophic loss even when the chances of
favorable outcomes are as great (or even greater) than the chances of catastrophic ones.”);
Diane Klein, Distorted Reasoning: Gender, Risk-Aversion and Negligence Law, 30 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 629, 636 (1997) (“A person is risk-averse . . . if he strictly prefers a certainty
consequence to any risky prospect whose mathematical expectation of consequences equals
that certainty.” (citation omitted)).
177. See, e.g., Aswath Damodaran, Applied Corporate Finance: A User’s Manual, Third
Edition, DAMODARAN ONLINE ch. 9, p. 17, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/
New_Home_Page/ACF3E/appldCF3E.htm (last visited June 14, 2014) (“Since every risky
investment or decision can potentially cause default, managers may hold back on
committing to new investments that they perceive as uncertain.”).
178. Anatoli Rest., Inc. v. Dep’t of Highways, No. CIV.A.98-6220, 2001 WL 498960, at
*5 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Apr. 26, 2001); see also David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel,
Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 835, 854 (2008) (“The questionable credibility of government commitments to future
levels of regulation diminishes the capacity of environmental regulations to induce
companies to invest in long-term research and development.”).
179. See, e.g., Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 685
F.2d 459, 543 n.167 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat’l Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983) (“The impact of regulatory uncertainty on the
incentive of public utilities to innovate has been well-chronicled.”); Linda Cohen,
Innovation and Atomic Energy: Nuclear Power Regulation, 1966–Present, 43 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 70-72 (1979) (time, expense, and uncertainty in acquiring NRC
licenses are key factors inhibiting innovation); see also City of Chicago v. AT&T
Broadband, Inc., No. 02 C 7517, 2003 WL 1888839, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2003) (“In order
to facilitate our national policy goals, we seek to clarify the authority of State and local
governments with respect to cable modem service . . . . [W]e seek to remove regulatory
uncertainty that may discourage investment and innovation in broadband services . . . .”
(citation omitted)); Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy
Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (2011).
180. R. Alex DuFour, Voice over Internet Protocol: Ending Uncertainty and Promoting
Innovation Through a Regulatory Framework, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 471, 487 (2005).
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repeatedly blamed for inaction on a variety of matters. 181 Energy
storage is no exception.
In certain instances, blaming uncertainty for inaction is valid,
particularly where the uncertainty reaches a degree where the scope
of the uncertainty is paralyzing for both those internal and external
to the situation and where eventual resolution is outside of the
control of the stakeholders. 182 But in other circumstances,
uncertainty appears to be an undeserving scapegoat for inaction. 183
Given the uncertainty surrounding energy storage, it seems
important to develop a framework for assessing the degree of the
uncertainty and to apply this framework to energy storage. This part
asserts that uncertainty is far from a singular concept. Instead, it
encompasses a spectrum of activity with varying causes,
181. See, e.g., Lyon & Li, supra note 19, at 2-3 (noting a number of examples of utilities
decreasing price targets and declining investments due to regulatory uncertainty); Jess
Davis, Dallas’ Inaction on Fracking Regs Driving Away Drillers, LAW360 (Jan. 23, 2013,
5:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/408939/dallas-inaction-on-fracking-regs-drivingaway-drillers (describing how several exploration and production companies have
withdrawn permit applications because of the city’s delay in issuing fracking regulations);
Patricia Fleischauer, Regulatory Uncertainty Hindering Offshore Wind Development,
ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.elp.com/articles/print/volume88/issue-2/sections/regulatory-uncertainty.html (describing the various regulatory factors
that have held back development of offshore wind resources); U.S. RMBS Recovery Held
Back by Regulatory Uncertainty, FITCH RATINGS (June 26, 2012, 11:34 AM),
http://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/U.S.-RMBS-Recovery?pr_id=
753601 (“[U]ncertainty relating to aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 has caused many
traditional RMBS issuers to delay their issuance plans.”); Memorandum from Eric Cantor,
Majority Leader of U.S. House of Representatives, to House Republicans, on Upcoming
Jobs Agenda (Aug. 29, 2011), available at http://majorityleader.gov/blog/2011/08/memo-onupcoming-jobs-agenda.html (characterizing regulatory uncertainty as a form of “costly
bureaucratic handcuffs” that produce a job-killing “cloud” over employers).
182. See, e.g., Kira R. Fabrizio, The Effect of Regulatory Uncertainty on Investment:
Evidence from Renewable Energy Generation, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 765, 766 (2012) (finding
that investment in new renewable generating assets in states with RPSs has been
significantly lower in states with histories of regulatory repeal than those with no history
of repealing restructuring legislation), Bill Frezza, Regulatory Uncertainty Drives a Fish
Farmer
to
Foreign
Waters,
FORBES
(Nov.
25,
2012,
5:55
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billfrezza/2012/11/25/regulatory-uncertainty-drives-a-fish-farmerto-foreign-waters/ (chronicling a business owner’s decision to move his offshore deep water
fish farming business to Panama in order to avoid the confusion and stress of overlapping
state and federal regulations that would apply to his business in the United States, none of
which acknowledge a lead agency or authority); See also discussion of Cape Wind, infra
note 257.
183. See, e.g., Sidney Shapiro, The Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011: Way Too
Much of a Good Thing, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2012, at 10, 11 (citing studies that
refute claims that regulatory uncertainty is holding back the economy); Kevin Drum,
Awkward Facts Kill the Regulatory Uncertainty Zombie, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 2, 2011),
http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2011/10?page=16 (“Our problem is high debt
levels and weak demand, not business-deadening regulations.”); Lawrence Mishel,
Regulatory Uncertainty: A Phony Explanation for Our Jobs Problem, ECON. POL’Y INST.
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.epi.org/publication/regulatory-uncertainty-phony-explanation
(arguing that regulatory uncertainty is a poor explanation for the lack of jobs problem).
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characteristics, and consequences. Implicit in this concept is an
understanding that there are multiple varieties of uncertainty with
differing degrees of impacts. Few examples of uncertainty are either
“all bad” or “all good,” with most varieties reflecting some degree of
both. An analysis of a specific variety of uncertainty will require a
balancing of the drawbacks and virtues of that uncertainty in any
specific situation.
To assist in categorizing uncertainty into places along a spectrum,
this part identifies three variables critical to developing a useable
framework for characterizing the different varieties of uncertainty:
(1) the context surrounding the uncertainty, (2) the scope of the
uncertainty, and (3) the source of the uncertainty, each of which is
discussed below. 184 This part applies this framework to energy
storage uncertainty and advances a more accepting notion of
uncertainty when three factors are present. Uncertainty is less
troubling when it is operating in the context of high baseline levels of
uncertainty, when it is limited in scope, and when the power to
resolve the uncertainty resides in discrete sources, particularly when
a federal source has intentionally chosen to embrace it and allows
states to act to fill the void.
A. Context for Energy Storage Uncertainty
The first relevant factor to consider when categorizing uncertainty
is the context of other uncertainty surrounding it. As Professor
Milliken has explained, “[U]ncertainty . . . is likely to be partially a
function of the characteristics of the environment in which the
organization is operating.” 185 Those organizations that function in a
volatile and complex environment may perceive more uncertainty
than those in simpler and more stable environments.186 Instead of a
blanket reason for inaction, whether a specific uncertainty is likely to
result in inaction depends in part on how risky that endeavor looks
compared to the expected future value of other outcomes. Where all
the alternatives have questionable expected future value, the
marginal difference may be less relevant than where the uncertainty
of one alternative is compared against options with more certain

184. “Some other elements of regulatory uncertainty that could be worth considering
include: frequency of potential policy change (frequent or infrequent), type of compliance
requirements (flexible/inflexible), and potential penalties for non-compliance (punitive or
benign).” Adam R. Fremeth & Brian K. Richter, Profiting from Environmental Regulatory
Uncertainty: Integrated Strategies for Competitive Advantage, 54 CALIF. MGMT. REV. 145,
163 n.5 (2011).
185. Milliken, supra note 17, at 137.
186. Id.
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future value.187 Therefore, the first parameter to be explored when
trying to characterize uncertainty is the context within which that
uncertainty operates.
In assessing context, this framework posits that uncertainty
should be characterized through a comparison with a baseline level.
Courts have acknowledged the importance of baseline levels of
uncertainty in assessing elements of claims. For instance, in order
to establish the element of causation, the plaintiff must show more
than the existence of uncertainty after the taking; it must show
that the 1998 taking, as distinct from those other events, brought
about a measurable change in the level of uncertainty, so as to affect
market value.188
Implicit in this assessment is an acceptance that uncertainty that
exists against a high baseline level of uncertainty is not as
troublesome as uncertainty amidst a relatively low baseline level of
uncertainty. 189 It is also important to remember that regardless of
risks that regulations can eliminate, “a great deal of exogenous” risk–
risk outside of what regulations can eliminate–will always exist.” 190
For these reasons, context is important for making more realistic
decisions about the proper response to the uncertainty.
The rest of this section assesses the uncertainty of energy storage
against the baseline level of uncertainty surrounding the energy
industry generally, with a specific focus on jurisdiction and cost
recovery. It argues that these are two areas rife with high baseline

187. See, e.g., Warren G. Lavey, Making and Keeping Regulatory Promises, 55 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1, 7 (2002) (discussing the investment choices industries face when confronted
with regulatory uncertainty); see also Michael E. Sykuta, The Nature of the Deal in the
Post-Crisis Financial Market, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 27, 35-38, 43 (2012) (discussing
several sources of uncertainty that can affect investment and the value of different
business transactions in such situations).
188. Anatoli Rest., Inc. v. Dep’t of Highways, No. CIV.A.98-6220, 2001 WL 498960, at
*5 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Apr. 26, 2001) (rejecting claims because the regulatory uncertainty the
plaintiffs faced failed to exceed the baseline level of regulatory uncertainty present before
plaintiff began construction).
189. See, e.g., Nupur Chowdhury, Common Market but Divergent Regulatory Practices:
Exploring European Regulation and the Effect on Regulatory Uncertainty in the Marketing
Authorization of Medical Products, 35 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 635, 645 (2013) (comparing the
regulatory uncertainty of pharmaceutical guidelines to that of the advanced therapy
products and characterizing the level of uncertainty through comparison with a baseline
level).
190. See generally Mordecai Kurz, Endogenous Uncertainty and Rational Belief
Equilibrium: A Unified Theory of Market Volatility, in GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM: PROBLEMS
& PROSPECTS 246, 246-48 (Fabio Petri & Frank Hahn eds., 2005) (distinguishing the
“exogenous” from “endogenous” uncertainty as risk and volatility that arises from external,
uncontrollable causes, including “weather conditions, earthquakes, technological changes,
fire destruction etc.”).
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levels of uncertainty—uncertainty that exists for all participants, not
just those associated with emerging technologies.
1. Jurisdictional Context
Energy is a dynamic and often volatile field, resulting in
regulatory uncertainties for all players involved. First, despite almost
eighty years of FPA jurisprudence, the energy field is wrought with
significant jurisdictional uncertainty. Under the FPA, FERC retains
jurisdiction over wholesale electricity transactions and transmission
rates, and states retain jurisdiction over retail electricity
transactions and generation and distribution facilities. 191 Despite this
seemingly bright line drawn by Congress, there is no shortage of
litigation that has ensued over line-drawing exercises between retail
and wholesale classifications. 192
Electric utilities dealing primarily with fossil fuel-related energy
sources are far from immune from uncertainty. 193 One example can
be found in the latest jurisdictional struggle between FERC and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) over energy
derivative “swap deals.” 194 Both agencies are claiming jurisdiction,
and commentators have suggested that “the routine use of swaps to
hedge market volatility due to weather, unforeseen demand, and
other factors would be severely disrupted if regulated by the
191. Section 201(a) grants FERC jurisdiction over “the transmission of electric energy
in interstate commerce” and, therefore, over transmission rates. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).
192. Electricity transactions are considered wholesale or retail, depending on whether
the sale is sold for resale (wholesale) or whether it is sold directly to an end user (retail).
See, e.g., Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927) (holding
that while states could regulate retail sales of electricity via the Commerce Clause, they
could not regulate wholesale sales); S. Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 603 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (holding that FERC failed to establish jurisdiction over CAISO netting rates);
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. FERC, 955 F.2d 1412 (10th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the notion
that if the state commission cannot have exclusive jurisdiction, it should, at minimum,
have concurrent jurisdiction due to the “local” nature of the distribution); Brief for
Respondent, Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, No. 11-1486 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 25, 2012),
available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/court-cases/briefs/2012/DC11-1486ElecPowerSupply
Assoc.pdf (defending FERC’s characterization of demand response as a wholesale
transaction subject to federal jurisdiction).
193. Although not jurisdictional regulatory uncertainty, another example of traditional
energy sources being subject to regulatory uncertainty is coal. Although EPA has insofar
only issued final carbon regulations for new fossil fuel plants, there is enough chatter about
regulations for existing fossil fuel plants to generate regulatory uncertainty surrounding
more traditional forms of energy products. Joanna M. Foster, EPA Publishes First Rule
Limiting Carbon Pollution from New Power Plants, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 9, 2014, 12:48
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/ climate/2014/01/09/3139921/epa-carbon-rule-power-plants.
194. Thomas A. Utzinger, Energy Companies Moving Forward with CFTC Compliance
Despite Uncertainties, REUTERS (May 31, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/financialregulatory-forum/2012/05/31/energy-companies-moving-forward-with-cftc-compliance-despiteuncertainties.
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CFTC.” 195 In addition to statutory and regulatory uncertainty,
constitutional preemption principles can wreak havoc with local
authorities’ exertion of authority over energy issues. This is wellillustrated by the recent controversies surrounding local authorities’
bans on hydraulic fracturing that are being challenged by states
under preemption grounds. 196 Indeed, these few examples
demonstrate that the jurisdictional uncertainty in the energy field is
far from limited to emerging technologies.
Emerging technologies merely present ideal vehicles to challenge
the jurisdictional limits. One recent example of an emerging energy
service that has created jurisdictional uncertainty is demand
response, customer-side curtailments in response to requests from
grid operators. Because demand response occurs on the customer side
of the meter, where states retain jurisdiction, many argue for state
jurisdiction over demand response charges. 197 FERC, however, has
recently exerted jurisdiction over demand response charges through
Order No. 745.198 In that Order, FERC treats demand response as the
functional equivalent of producing energy for sale at wholesale, rates
that are under FERC authority. 199 Creating another layer of
regulatory uncertainty, the D.C. Circuit vacated FERC’s Order No.
745 as ultra vires regulation of the retail market in May 2014, a
decision for which FERC is seeking en banc review. 200
195. Id.
196. Sorell E. Negro, Fracking Wars: Federal, State and Local Conflicts over the
Regulation of Natural Gas Activities, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Feb. 2012, at 1, 1-2,
available
at
http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/FrackingWars.pdf; See Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013); Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 964 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2013) (both holding New York’s Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law does not
expressly or impliedly preempt municipal land use laws).
197. In EnergyConnect, Inc., 130 FERC ¶ 61,031 (2010), FERC determined that it
“do[es] not regard agreements to provide services from only demand response resources to
be jurisdictional facilities because they involve agreements to reduce demand, i.e.,
agreements not to purchase electric energy under certain circumstances, rather than
agreements to sell electric energy at wholesale.” See Demand Response Compensation in
Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, Order No. 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (Mar. 15, 2011)
[hereinafter FERC Order No. 745]; see also Wholesale Competition in Regions with
Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 125 FERC ¶ 61,071 (Oct. 17, 2008) (requiring
ISO/RTOs to accept bids from demand response resources in markets for certain ancillary
services on a basis comparable to other resources).
198. See FERC Order No. 745, supra note 197.
199. Id.
200. See Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, No. 11-1486 (D.C. Cir. 2014), available
at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/DE531DBFA7DE1ABE85257CE100
4F4C53/$file/11-1486-1494281.pdf; FERC to Seek en banc Review of Demand Response
Ruling, FERC (June 11, 2014), https://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2014/2014-2/0611-14.asp#.U7Gm5xaC22w; see also Ind. Util. Reg. Comm’n v. FERC, 668 F.3d 735 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (upholding FERC’s approval of an RTO tariff aimed at demand response
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2. Cost Recovery Context
Second, cost recovery is governed by a complex web of both
regulated and restructured mechanisms, all of which are laden with
inherent uncertainty. Traditional cost-of-service can involve a
substantial risk of cost recovery of capital expenditures. As discussed
above, public utility commissions allow utilities to recover under costof-service formulas based on the fixed and variable costs, coupled
with a profit. Utilities are generally expected to make investments
before they know how much will be recovered and how quickly. In
fact, recovery of these investments usually does not begin until after
the facility is operational. 201 Much like the FPA, most state
regulation of utility rates incorporates a statutory “just and
reasonable” standard, a vague standard imbued with uncertainty
itself. 202 Recovery is governed by one or a mixture of a “prudent
investment” and a “used and useful” standard, which has led to
varying disallowed costs.203
Years of failed investments in nuclear power facilities, for
instance, led to a body of law on stranded investments, as did the
transition of some states from regulated to restructured retail
electricity regimes. 204 Although FERC Order No. 888 now grants the
measures, holding that the PUC had not met its burden of proof that the tariff
impermissibly blurred the line between state and federal jurisdiction under the Federal
Power Act); Hon. Jon Wellinghoff & David L. Morenoff, Recognizing the Importance of
Demand Response: The Second Half of the Wholesale Electric Market Equation, 28 ENERGY
L.J. 389, 405 (2007) (“[T]o the extent that demand response can be characterized as
involving such a wholesale sale of electric energy, it would fall within the Commission's
jurisdiction under the FPA . . . [and] the Commission may facilitate demand response in
wholesale markets because demand response directly and significantly affects wholesale
rates.”).
201. Russell A. Feingold, Regulatory Uncertainty: The Ratemaking Challenge
Continues, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 2004, at 52, 54, available at
http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2004/11/regulatory-uncertainty-ratemaking-challengecontinues?page=0%2C1 (“[M]anagement has forgotten that utilities must invest in
infrastructure and then file rate cases to earn on the investment.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). A few allow for preapprovals by the PUC. See SCOTT HEMPLING & SCOTT
H. STRAUSS, PRE-APPROVAL COMMITMENTS: WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS SHOULD
REGULATORS COMMIT RATEPAYER DOLLARS TO UTILITY-PROPOSED CAPITAL PROJECTS? 1519 (2008) (discussing various options utilized by state PUCs for implementing preapproved cost recovery).
202. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (West 2013) (“All charges demanded or
received by any public utility . . . shall be just and reasonable.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66101(b) (2012) (“Every electric public utility governed by this act shall be required . . . to
establish just and reasonable rates . . . .”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-27-810 (2012) (“Rates shall
be just and reasonable.”).
203. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989) (disallowing millions
of dollars invested in nuclear plants that were never completed due to changing market
conditions).
204. See, e.g., FERC Order No. 888, supra note 136 (noting that “the construction of
nuclear and other capital-intensive baseload facilities—actively encouraged by federal and
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right to recovery of stranded costs associated with wholesale
transmission and distribution of electricity, there is still uncertainty
about the legitimacy and valuation of such costs. 205 “On one hand,
neither regulation nor the Constitution guarantee utilities a right to
profits; on the other hand, consumers may pay high retail prices
where regulators approve expensive utility actions.” 206
The uncertainty faced by energy storage is not so far above the
baseline level of cost recovery uncertainty in the industry such as to
render it a complete obstacle to its development. For instance, FERC
has expressly noted that the possibility of stranded costs caused by
administrative errors is not unique to energy storage. “This
possibility exists throughout the utility industry and is not uniquely
attributable to utilities with energy storage operations.” 207
In fact, an argument can be made that the likelihood of cost
recovery for energy storage is even more likely. Although some forms
of energy storage like CAES may be as expensive as or more
expensive than traditional forms of energy infrastructure to
construct, other forms of energy storage can cost significantly less
than the alternatives. One example can be found in Wisconsin, where
the PUC installed a magnetic energy storage system to upgrade its
transmission line for stability, where the energy storage “provided
the very short duration needed at roughly one tenth the cost and a
faster, less intrusive installation” than alternative transmission
upgrades.208 Although this project sought cost recovery through
FERC-regulated transaction rates, such a shorter start-up time
means there is even less chance for the rules to change, and it is less
likely that they could become “un-used” and “un-useful” prior to cost
recovery in traditional regulated regimes.

some state governments—contributed to the continuing cost increases and uncertainties in
the industry” and “[b]etween 1985 and 1992, writeoffs of nuclear power plants totalled
$22.4 billion,” significantly reducing the earnings of the affected utilities); see also Town of
Norwood v. FERC, 80 F.3d 526 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (where ratepayers sought review of a
FERC order allowing a utility to recover 100% of its unamortized investment in a nuclear
plant after the utility shut down the plant before its license expired); Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (where a utility sought review of a
FERC order modifying the utility’s rate schedule to exclude a $397 million investment in a
nuclear power plant that was cancelled after construction commenced); CenterPoint
Energy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 143 S.W.3d 81, 82-83 (Tex. 2004) (summarizing
the stranded cost predicament of utilities following the partial deregulation of the Texas
electric power industry in 1999).
205. FERC Order No. 888, supra note 136.
206. Mark Wiranowski, Competitive Smart Grid Pilots: A Means to Overcome Incentive
and Informational Problems, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 361, 382 (2012).
207. FERC Order No. 784, supra note 12, ¶ 134.
208. ABDURRAHMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 3.
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In sum, energy stakeholders operate in a world with a significant
baseline level of uncertainty, one in which investors nonetheless see
fit to move forward with energy infrastructure. The uncertainty
caused by an emerging technology like energy storage is not
sufficiently outside the range of reasonable uncertainty that exists
for many players in the energy industry.
B. Scope of Energy Storage Uncertainty
A second relevant factor to aid in the characterization of
uncertainty is the scope of the uncertainty involved. Scope refers to
the extent of the impact caused by the uncertainty, which can include
an assessment of short-term and long-term uncertainty. The varying
scope and time-scale relevance has been recognized by Professor
Hoffman, who has divided uncertainty into three categories that
encompass “current implementation, medium-term measures and
rules, and long-term political direction.” 209 The narrower the range of
impacts to the regulated entities, the less troublesome the scope. 210
In one sense, the scope of the uncertainty faced by energy storage
is expansive. The classification of energy storage affects not only the
return on investment, but whether the project can even proceed. In
this manner, the uncertainty of emerging technologies is distinct
from that of existing technologies. Although one could characterize it
as how cost recovery will proceed, the fact that there are multiple
value streams incompatible with both regulated and market-based
recovery means that there is also a chance that energy storage
developers will not be able to obtain any cost recovery for certain
aspects of a given energy storage technology. 211 But this uncertainty
can be classified as short-term “current implementation” uncertainty,
one that must be compared with the longer-term uncertainty.
In another sense, the scope of uncertainty faced by energy storage
developers is continually being narrowed. Beyond the federal
209. Hoffman et al., supra note 172, at 1237.
210. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case
of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1509-10 (2007) (“Regulatory uncertainty that
are broad in scope may impose substantial costs.”). As an example, pollution control
statutes like the Clean Air Act mandate an agency to develop air quality standards for six
specific criteria pollutants, but there may be regulatory uncertainty about how exactly
those standards will be determined and what exactly those standards will be. The cost
differential between one type of standard and another type of standard may be substantial,
but narrower than the difference between complying with a standard and not having to
comply at all. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1990).
211. Cf., e.g., Morgan Lee, SDG&E’s Request to Recover 2007 Fire Costs Denied, UNIONTRIBUNE SAN DIEGO (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/Oct/16/sdgesrequest-to-recover-2007-fire-costs-denied/ (rejecting utility’s costs to respond to fire damage
in an opinion from the California Public Utilities Commission).
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classification of energy storage, investors can look to other proxies to
provide confidence in the federal regulatory treatment of energy
storage. There are many other signals that investors should take into
account beyond whether a federal agency will conclusively determine
the proper asset classification label for an emerging technology. This
is particularly important in determining the longer-term political
direction. “To the extent that waiting leads to the resolution of some
of the relevant regulatory uncertainty, the firm may face an option
value to delaying investment.” 212 But where a primary reason is to
gather further assurances about the “state’s commitment” to the
cause, other proxies are important.213 In this case, it is relevant
whether FERC is taking any other action, positive or negative, with
respect to energy storage. 214 This evaluation reveals that FERC is
moving forward in ways that demonstrate its market support for
energy storage, effectively narrowing the scope of uncertainty. As a
government report indicated:
If the entity is in a centrally dispatched market like MISO, the
ISO needs to have sufficient tariffs and other market mechanisms
in place to enable the storage owner to achieve the full value of the
benefits available from all of the storage facility’s attributes. In the
absence of such tariffs and market mechanisms, many of the
potential benefits of the storage facility will go un-monetized, or
will accrue to the benefit of market participants other than the
storage owners. 215

Effective market treatment for energy storage is particularly
important since “much of the nation’s energy infrastructure is now
owned or being developed by independent power producers who lack
utility-rate base cost recovery structures” and rely exclusively on
market-based rates for recovery of their costs.216 Accordingly, FERC
has claimed jurisdiction over some of these energy storage services,
212. Jun Ishii & Jingming Yan, Investment Under Regulatory Uncertainty: U.S.
Electricity Generation Investment Since 1996, 6 (Ctr. for the Study of Energy Mkts.,
Working Paper No. 137, 2004), available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/
csemmwp12.pdf.
213. Id.
214. For a legislative perspective, see S. Res. 1030, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted), S.
Res. 795, 113th Cong. (2011) (enacted), and S. Res. 1845, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted).
215. SCHULTE ET AL., supra note 150, at 79; see also DENHOLM ET AL., supra note 15, at
9 (The government has suggested that “perhaps the single greatest motivation for
proposals to build new energy storage is the creation of markets for both energy and
ancillary services including regulation, contingency reserves, and capacity.”).
216. Comments of the National Hydropower Association on the June 16, 2011 Notice
Inquiry Re Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting and Financial
Reporting for New Electric Storage Technologies, FERC Dkt. Nos. RM11-24-000 and AD1013-000, at 8-9, available at http://www.hydro.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/NHAComments-on-Ancillary-Services-NOI-Final.pdf.
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issuing important rulemakings to enhance facilitation of energy
storage services onto the grid.
First, in 2007, FERC issued Order No. 890, which required
wholesale markets to consider non-generation resources (including
storage and distributed resources) for grid services. 217 The order
required that these non-generation resources be evaluated on a
comparable basis to services provided by generation resources in
meeting mandatory reliability standards, providing ancillary
services, and planning the expansion of the transmission grid. This
was an important recognition of the importance of non-traditional
resources like energy storage, demand response, combined heat and
power, and variable energy resources (renewables). 218
Second, in 2011, FERC issued Order No. 755, requiring
jurisdictional utilities to pay a premium for “faster-ramping
resources” for regulation service, citing energy storage as an example
of a technology that is not currently valued appropriately.219 In the
ISO and RTO markets, compensation for frequency regulation service
is presently based on several complicated components. 220 FERC has
found that “current frequency regulation compensation practices of
RTOs and ISOs result in rates that are unjust, unreasonable, and
unduly discriminatory or preferential” and has finalized new rules
for frequency regulation services intended to level the playing field
for energy storage.221 In response to this order, a number of market
operators have created new tariffs allowing storage to participate in
ancillary service markets that resulted in expanded deployment of
“124 MWs of energy storage by the end of 2012.” 222
217. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order
No. 890, 118 FERC ¶ 61,119 (Feb. 16, 2007) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 890].
218. Comments of the Electricity Consumer Resource Council, FERC Dkt. No. AD1013-000, at 3, available at http://www.elcon.org/Documents/FERCFilings/2010/FERC8-910.pdf (“The threshold issue before FERC is the need to retool resource eligibility
standards and to adopt the tariff and market rule changes that will enable access to
wholesale power markets by non-traditional resources.”).
219. See FERC Order No. 755, supra note 68, ¶¶ 5, 11.
220. Id. ¶¶ 6-10.
221. Id. ¶ 2; FERC has noted that “current compensation methods for regulation
service in RTO and ISO markets fail to acknowledge the inherently greater amount of
frequency regulation service being provided by faster-ramping resources.” Id. With the
exception of ISO-NE, the RTOs and ISOs limit compensation to frequency regulation
resources to a capacity payment and net energy balancing. Id. ¶¶ 6-10. Until recently, the
rate paid for frequency regulation services supplied by traditional fossil-fuel plants and
gas-fired turbines was the same as the rate paid to fast-ramping storage systems such as
batteries and flywheels. Id. ¶ 2.
222. ELEC. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 60, at 15. For example, Midwest ISO created a
stored energy resources tariff. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., Order
Conditionally Accepting Stored Resources Compliance Filing, 131 FERC ¶ 61,128 (May 10,
2010), available at http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20100510142914-ER09-1126-
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Additional steps are being taken to address these potential
problems in lieu of regulatory clarity on classifications. In July 2013,
FERC expanded its rulemakings affecting energy storage with Order
No. 784.223 In addition to payment premiums provided for in Order
No. 755, Order No. 784 now requires each public utility transmission
provider to take into account the speed and accuracy of regulation
resources in its determination of reserve requirements, two
parameters where energy storage excels. 224 It also amends a
historical restriction to now allow energy storage to provide ancillary
services to transmission providers at market-based rates where
appropriate.225 Despite its embrace of uncertainty with respect to the
classification of energy storage, FERC explicitly found that “there is
a need for certainty in the accounting and reporting treatment for
energy storage assets and operations, especially in instances where
utilities seek to recover costs of energy storage operations in costbased rates.” 226 In response, FERC issued a final accounting
rulemaking that requires separate accounts for energy storage within
each of the traditional asset categories to better allow FERC to
“monitor these utilities’ operations to prevent and discourage crosssubsidization between cost-based and market-based activities.”227
Most recently, FERC issued Order No. 792, which revised the pro
forma Small Generator Interconnection Agreement and Procedures
to specifically include energy storage devices. 228 The revisions are
designed to establish terms and conditions for public utilities to
provide just and reasonable interconnection service for small
generators.229 This amendment to the original Order No. 2006 adds
energy storage to the category of resources that are authorized to use
these procedures or a fast track interconnection process and provides
clarification on the sizing of storage devices. 230
001.pdf. Also, the New York ISO created a limited energy storage resource tariff. N.Y.
Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Order Accepting Tariff Revisions, 127 FERC ¶ 61,135 (May 15,
2009), available at http://www.ferc.gov/eventcalendar/Files/20090515142559-ER09-836000.pdf.
223. FERC Order No. 784, supra note 12.
224. Id. ¶ 1; see supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
225. Id. ¶ 9, 13.
226. Id. ¶ 124.
227. Id. ¶ 125 (Comments on the notice of proposed rulemaking demonstrate a
wariness for increased administrative burdens, and alternative suggestions were to record
the cost of an energy storage asset in a single plant account and allocate its cost to the
various functions it performs using current ratemaking methods.).
228. Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Order No. 792, 145
FERC ¶ 61,159, ¶ 1 (Nov. 22, 2013) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 792].
229. Id. ¶ 2.
230. Id. ¶ 227-31.
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Despite FERC’s embrace of uncertainty with respect to asset
classification, FERC’s actions taken as a whole are not representative
of an agency that is sitting on its hands, generating inconsistent
outcomes, or otherwise fostering a high-risk, unsupportive
environment for energy storage. On the contrary, as energy storage
counsel has indicated that “[t]he main message that FERC is
sending . . . is that we need these technologies, and markets should
send signals that say we need them, we’re going to pay for them. If
companies are making money and can repay their shareholders, then
more will invest.” 231 Uncertainty in some short-term and long-term
areas should be weighed against each other. For instance, although
there is uncertainty about “current implementation” surrounding
energy storage, these efforts demonstrate there is less uncertainty
about the “long-term political direction” of energy storage.232 This
suggests that investment in energy storage should come despite
uncertainty in some areas, so long as there are other signals that
provide them some comfort.
C. Source of Energy Storage Uncertainty
A third factor to assist in the characterization of uncertainty is the
source of the certainty. Regulatory uncertainty can result from a wide
variety of sources, including vague regulations,233 agency inaction,234
inconsistency in agency positions,235 agency changes in regulatory
231. Michael T. Burr, What Happened at Beacon: Election Politics Almost Killed a
Great Idea, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, May 2012, at 4, 6, available at
http://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2012/05/what-happened-beacon.
232. Hoffman et al., supra note 172, at 1237.
233. The Supreme Court, for example, was recently obliged to resolve regulatory
vagueness under the Clean Water Act in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense
Center, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337 (2013), where it overturned a Ninth Circuit determination
that logging road ditches and culverts are point sources that require a permit under the
Clean Water Act. Justice Scalia, in dissent, delivered a powerful indictment of vague
agency regulations, arguing that agencies are incentivized to issue vague rules because
“the power to prescribe is augmented by the power to interpret . . . .” Id. at 1341 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Global Climate Change and Regulatory Uncertainty, 9
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 259, 263 (1992) (discussing the regulatory uncertainty caused by
delayed regulation of an action like climate change). Definitive federal fracking
regulations, for example, have been held in a sustained state of regulatory limbo as EPA
completes studies investigating groundwater contamination and methane leakage
associated with hydraulic fracturing. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Energy Res. Conservation &
Dev. Comm’n, 197 Cal. Rptr. 866, 877-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (The court noted that while
stakeholders are waiting for the commission to make its jurisdictional determination, “[t]he
attendant delay, expense, and uncertainty might well create regulatory havoc.”).
235. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 179, at 39 (noting regulatory uncertainty that can
result from governmental commitments of questionable credibility that had been
previously revoked); see also United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129,
1141 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining that an agency “remains free to hear new arguments,
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goals,236 changes in agency administrators,237 judicial action reviewing
agency action or rulemakings, and some combination of the above.238
Governmental actors can even be both the source239 and the recipient240
of uncertainty, depending on the circumstances. Furthermore,

make adjustments, and change directions” without having to undergo notice and comment
because it “commits itself to a particular interpretation of its own regulation only when it
adopts that interpretation definitively . . . .”); John Miller, EPA Reverses Course, Nixes
Idaho Pollution Rule, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 25, 2013, 10:43 AM),
http://news.yahoo.com/epa-reverses-course-nixes-idaho-144345912.html (discussing the
reversal of a state water quality rule that was approved by EPA two years prior).
236. It is common practice for the EPA to make various regulatory goals more stringent
in response to updated scientific findings. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVIEW OF
THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR OZONE: POLICY ASSESSMENT OF
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 6-81, available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/
standards/ozone/data/2007_07_ozone_staff_paper.pdf (concluding that new scientific
information supported tightening NAAQS ozone standards); see also Juliet Eilperin, EPA
Tightens Soot Rules By 20 Percent, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.washington
post.com/national/health-science/epa-to-tighten-soot-rules-by-20-percent/2012/12/14/5d39c0
c0-4541-11e2-8061-253bccfc7532_story.html. But see, e.g., Letter from Cass R. Sunstein,
Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa P. Jackson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency
(Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/return/EPA_Return_Letter_9-22011.pdf (rejecting EPA’s proposal to revise the air quality standard for ozone based in part
on the “needless” regulatory uncertainty that would result from revising the standards
when another revision was anticipated in the near future).
237. Andrew B. Whitford, The Reduction of Regulatory Uncertainty: Evidence From
Transfer Pricing Policy, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 269, 273 (2004) (“Regulatory uncertainty may
come in the form of variations in antitrust policy with changes in administration or
environmental policy due to changes in social tastes for protection.”). EPA provided
regulatory certainty on the question of the EPA’s authority to regulate carbon dioxide
under the Clean Air Act only to be reversed when a subsequent EPA Administrator took
office, a decision that was later reversed by the Supreme Court. See Massachusetts v. EPA,
549 U.S. 497 (2007); Memo from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to EPA
Regional Administrators (Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/
psd_interpretive_memo_12.18.08.pdf.
238. Patrick MacElroy, Four Keys to Managing Regulatory Uncertainty, BLACK &
VEATCH,
http://bv.com/Home/news/thought-leadership/security-and-risk-managementissues/four-keys-to-managing-regulatory-uncertainty (last visited June 14, 2014)
(“Regulatory risk can take many forms, including legislation, court action or changes in
regulatory goals.” (citation omitted)); see also Chowdhury, supra note 189, at 637 (“Sources
of ambiguity may include the structure and substance of the norms themselves, or the
institutional mechanisms that enforce those norms, the lack of a clear adjudicatory
mechanism in case of dispute over interpretation of those norms, etc. Herein it is important
to underline that, since regulations change over time—it is a dynamic activity—
uncertainty is therefore endemic to every regulatory system.”). In addition, see the D.C.
Circuit’s recent reversal of FERC’s order regarding demand response supra note 200.
239. Shapiro, supra note 183, at 10 (describing the federal legislature’s bill that would
add 2 to 2.5 years to the rulemaking ossification, thereby increasing regulatory
uncertainty).
240. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An
Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1430 (2012) (“The mere fact that OMB can reverse a regulatory
decision might also inject significant uncertainty into the regulatory process, further
discouraging the agency from acting.”).
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uncertainty is not a static concept. Even those seemingly certain
regulations run the risk of becoming uncertain.241
Other scholars point to the failure of law to keep pace with
technology, creating lags that generate pockets of uncertainty. 242 A
survey of utility leaders, for instance, indicated that “regulatory
uncertainty most often is caused by lack of longer-term direction and
progression of regulatory decisions, unanticipated actions by
regulators and their impact upon a utility’s current business
strategies, . . . the potential for costs disallowances,” inconsistent
application of policies by state regulators, and lack of regulator
understanding of key issues facing utilities.243 Uncertainty can be the
result of one or more of these circumstances.
The source of uncertainty affects its treatment in at least two key
respects. First, uncertainty may be less troublesome in cases where
the regulator has intentionally embraced the uncertainty to harness
its positive virtues than where the uncertainty has been thrust upon
the regulated community due to a confluence of multiple
circumstances. This is consistent with the biases that taint our
241. For instance, consider the EPA’s proposed rule on the treatment of air pollution
that migrates across state borders. The agency strived to reduce the uncertainty of the
rule, engaged in notice and comment rulemaking, and issued a final rule. Rule To Reduce
Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule), 70
Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78 and
96). Despite this illusion of certainty, the D.C. Circuit struck down the rule just three years
later. North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The EPA’s second attempt at
a revised rule in 2011 was again struck down by the same court. Federal Implementation
Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP
Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 51, 72, 78
and 97); EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also
Kenneth Colburn, Least-Risk Planning, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 2012, at 38, 41,
available at http://mag.fortnightly.com/display_article.php?id=1241684&_width= (The D.C.
Circuit’s rejection of the EPA’s cross-state air pollution rule served “to perpetuate the
profound regulatory uncertainty clouding the future of the electric power sector. At a time
of great change in the energy industry, when substantial energy infrastructure
investments are needed nationally and energy technology is a growing basis for
international competitiveness, chronic regulatory uncertainty can have sclerotic economic
consequences.”).
242. See, e.g., Gary E. Marchant et al., What Does the History of Technology Regulation
Teach Us About Nano Oversight?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 724, 726-27 (2009) (“Lyria
Bennett Moses has identified four potential problems that may result from the failure of
law to keep pace with technology, including: (1) the failure to impose appropriate legal
restrictions and precautions to control the risks of new technologies; (2) uncertainties in
the application of existing legal frameworks to new technologies; (3) the potential for
existing rules to either under- or over-regulate new technologies; and (4) the potential for
technology to make existing rules obsolete.”); see also Feingold, supra note 201, at 53
(“Interestingly, more than 90 percent of survey respondents either strongly agreed or
agreed with the proposition that regulatory uncertainty is caused by the energy market
changing at a faster pace than the related regulatory policies that establish the rules of the
game in the marketplace.”).
243. Feingold, supra note 201, at 53.
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decisionmaking. For instance, one bias is a tendency to discount risks
that are undertaken voluntarily and to exaggerate risks that are
imposed upon us. 244 Similarly, stakeholders may discount the risks of
uncertainty that are intentionally and voluntarily embraced. But
such intentional, structured uncertainty may be partially justified by
an agency’s efforts to harness some of the advantages of uncertainty,
including flexibility and the allowance of market-driven development.
Arguably the largest benefit of uncertainty is its ability to be
flexible and responsive to varied facts and changing circumstances.
Courts and agencies have repeatedly embraced agency case-by-case
analyses in a number of contexts, driven largely by a desire to be
flexible yet narrowly tailored to prevent a broadly applicable
alternative that could both under-regulate and over-regulate.245 Caseby-case treatment allows states and federal regulators to experiment
with decisions that have individual impacts instead of risking an
entire industry through sweeping regulations. 246
The flexibility that accompanies this type of uncertainty is
consistent with scholars who have emphasized the importance of
adaptive mechanisms when dealing with emerging technologies. As
Professor Buzbee has noted, although legal stability and knowable
legal obligations are essential, there is a “stability-innovation

244. Cass R. Sunstein, A Note on “Voluntary” Versus “Involuntary” Risks, 8 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 173, 173-74 (1997) (noting that even though car accidents are more
likely than airplane crashes, people discount the risk of car accidents because they have a
greater sense of control over that risk); see also Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482
F.2d 672 (1973). See generally Lennart Sjöberg, Factors in Risk Perception, 20 RISK
ANALYSIS 1, 2-3 (2000).
245. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (articulating the
importance of both agency decisionmaking processes) (“[T]he agency must retain power to
deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be
effective. There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory
standards. And the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad
hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency.”); Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901, 910, 919 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming
EPA’s use of a case-by-case analysis under the Clean Air Act to determine the RMRR
under PSD modifications).
246. Importantly, such case-by-case treatment is distinct from inaction, which raises
particularly pernicious questions of dereliction of duty on the part of regulators to address
an urgent problem. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Groups Sue After E.P.A. Fails to Shift Ozone
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/science/
earth/12epa.html (rejection by the Obama Administration of stricter ozone pollution
standards); Five Groups Sue EPA Over Punt on Biogenic Greenhouse Gas Regulation,
P’SHIP FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.pfpi.net/five-groups-sue-epa-overpunt-on-biogenic-greenhouse-gas-regulation (withdrawal of regulations on biomass carbon
emissions); Groups Sue EPA After Agency Pulls Clean Water Act Enforcement, NAT’L
SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://sustainableagriculture.net/blog/epa-cafolawsuit/ (withdrawal of proposed regulations on concentrated animal feeding operations).
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tradeoff.” 247 In this case, even if innovations and improved results are
possible, “legal strategies and resulting obligations” become solidified
and are “seldom revisited.” 248 Professor Mandel has suggested that
“[o]ne method for achieving adaptability and flexibility is for
emerging technology governance to include mechanisms that allow
for incremental changes in governance as the need arises.” 249 He
highlights one of the benefits of emerging technologies in that it
“often means that interests and organizations have not yet fully
vested around a particular system or become wedded to a status
quo.” 250 Professor Mandel recommends that “[a] particular system of
governance should be developed, followed by data gathering, followed
by result evaluation, followed by modifications to the system as
warranted, in a continuing cycle until industry and scientific
understanding has matured.” 251
Another benefit of uncertainty may be its ability to yield to the
market. This is particularly important where an emerging technology
is at issue. These technologies involve extremely high capital
intensity and infrastructure dependence, an uncertain revenue
stream that depends on regulatory decisions, uncertainties about the
technology’s performance and the regulatory context at scale, and a
complex value-chain needing coordinated action from multiple
relevant parties. 252 If the government were to intervene with a
precise classification before the technology has matured, developers
might tailor their investment decisions to the regulations as opposed
to the market.253 For instance, they might shape their investment
247. William W. Buzbee, Clean Air Act Dynamism and Disappointments: Lessons for
Climate Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage Inertia, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
33, 35 (2010).
248. Id.
249. Gregory N. Mandel, Regulating Emerging Technologies, 1 LAW, INNOVATION &
TECH. 75, 89 (2009).
250. Id. at 81; Belinda Bennett, Expanding Horizons: Scientific Frontiers, Legal
Regulation, and Globalization, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 507, 524 (2012) (“[I]t is
important to accept that a legal solution may only be temporary. This means accepting that
laws may need to be subject to regular review, and possibly regular change, in response to
new needs and new knowledge.”).
251. Mandel, supra note 249, at 89 (proposing options in final rules to avoid
Administrative Procedure Act limitations on evolving regulations).
252. See, e.g., Varun Rai et al., Carbon Capture and Storage at Scale: Lessons from the
Growth of Analogous Energy Technologies, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 4089, 4089-90 (2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1400163.
253. See id. at 4092 (“The optimal conditions for a technology’s validation exist when
the strategic interests of government and businesses align.”); Elizabeth Burleson &
Winslow Burleson, Innovation Cooperation: Energy Biosciences and Law, 2011 U. ILL. L.
REV. 651, 679 (“Governments have a crucial role to play in . . . open innovation.”). But see
Gaia J. Larsen, Skewed Incentives: How Offshore Drilling Policies Fail to Induce
Innovation to Reduce Social and Environmental Costs, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 150
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decisions to avoid certain classifications or invest in those
technologies that are treated more favorably by the agency.
Regulating with too much specificity also has the potential to favor
known existing technologies at the potential expense of unknown
future technologies. In short, choosing a classification at this early
point in the commercialization of energy storage may influence firm
behavior in a way that is not the most beneficial.
Using traditional regulatory tools to drive technological
innovation requires detailed knowledge about the desired course of
technological change and what sorts of innovations are likely or
foreseeable. 254 But government regulators rarely have the necessary
information or foresight to drive innovation this way. Where the
government is uncertain of either the technology or the best future
use of the technology, it may make sense to allow other factors to
drive these decisions. “Even if regulators were to identify a proper
target initially, the regulatory process changes so slowly that
regulatory standards would be unlikely to keep up with technological
change or account for new information.” 255 Instead of being driven
by regulatory definitions, some uncertainty allows technologies to
be driven by demand. In short, the government needs to send
signals that it believes in the value of the emerging service, but
not regulate so narrowly that it drives how or which precise
technology develops to provide that service. This is not to say that
intentional uncertainty will always yield positive results, 256 but that

(2012) (explaining that the market alone does not foster enough innovation and that the
government must intervene to influence technological innovation).
254. The International Energy Agency, for example, recently promulgated an
implementing agreement between thirteen countries in order “to formulate effective
policies that increase production and trade in [energy efficient appliances and equipment].”
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, TECHNOLOGY-FORCING STANDARDS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY:
EFFICIENT ELECTRICAL END-USE EQUIPMENT (4E), at ii (2012). The Agency noted that farreaching regulatory action concerning end-use electrical equipment was justified because
technology-forcing standards for appliances would likely enable research and development,
bring forward significant technology changes, and provide industry long-term regulatory
certainty. Id. at v.
255. Adler, supra note 179, at 37.
256. Jon C. Dubin, Overcoming Gridlock: Campbell After a Quarter-Century and
Bureaucratically Rational Gap-Filling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the Social Security
Administration’s Disability Programs, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 937, 944 (2010) (finding that
although the Social Security Administration’s application of disability rules was intended
to provide clarity, it instead led to inconsistent results, rendering severely disabled
claimants, such as epileptics or psychotics, ineligible for benefits while rendering much less
disabled claimants, such as arthritics, eligible); Andrew A. Lundgren, Sarbanes-Oxley,
Then Disney: The Post-Scandal Corporate-Governance Plot Thickens, 8 DEL. L. REV. 195,
199 (2006) (pointing to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an example of legislation designed to
grant flexibility but produced a climate that is “exactly the opposite of what Congress
intended to do.”).
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there is a better chance for positive results when risks are
undertaken than when risks are imposed.
Second, uncertainty may be less troublesome where there is
unilateral as opposed to multiple sources. Uncertainty that is an
involuntary confluence of multiple factors outside the control of any
one actor is more troublesome than uncertainty that is intentionally
embraced by a single actor. Multiple sources render it less likely that
the uncertainty can be easily resolved and increase the transaction
costs of reducing the uncertainty from multiple sources. To
demonstrate this point, one need only look to the Cape Wind fiasco.
In that situation, the stakeholders involved in developing the nation’s
first offshore wind farm experienced uncertainty from a myriad of
sources, including the Department of the Interior, the state of
Massachusetts, and even the Federal Aviation Administration,
resulting in decade-long delays.257
Applying this factor to energy storage reveals a more discrete and
manageable source of uncertainty. FERC responded to this
uncertainty with an explicit embrace of it, declining to resolve the
issue with general applicability and instead approaching each unique
energy storage technology on a case-by-case, fact-specific basis. FERC
has stated that “electricity storage devices, in a general sense, do not
readily fit neatly into either of the traditional functions of generation,
transmission or distribution.” 258 Similarly, FERC Commissioner
Moeller has said, “Our overall view is that energy storage is unique
and doesn’t fit neatly into the distribution or transmission box.” 259
For FERC to do otherwise may have been criticized as premature.
Regulating with more certainty at this point in the emerging
technology cycle may have caused more damage than good. It would
have eliminated the flexibility inherent in the current case-by-case
analyses and could have thwarted creativity and market-driven
moves on the part of energy storage developers. For instance, if
257. See Jay Lindsay, APNewsBreak: FAA Felt Offshore Wind Farm Pressure,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 15, 2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/apnewsbreak-faa-feltoffshore-wind-farm-pressure (describing confusion over FAA’s efficacy of modifications
required for FAA permitting and subsequent allegations that FAA’s ultimate permitting
decision was politically motivated); Tom Zeller, Jr., Cape Wind: Regulation, Litigation and
the Struggle to Develop Offshore Wind Power in the U.S., RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM
(Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2013/02/cape-windregulation-litigation-and-the-struggle-to-develop-offshore-wind-power-in-the-u-s?page=4
(noting the novelty of offshore wind permitting and confusion as to whether the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers or the Department of the Interior held responsibility for the project’s
environmental review).
258. Western Grid Development, L.L.C., 133 FERC ¶ 61,029, ¶ 11 (Oct. 12, 2010).
259. Eric Wesoff, FERC’s Commissioner on Energy Storage, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan.
18,
2011),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-view-from-ferc-on-energystorage.
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FERC had expressly delineated the type of energy storage that
satisfied their definition of a generation asset, firms may have
tailored their investment towards those types of energy storage even
if the grid was more in need of others. 260 By the same token, in
addition to reaping some of the virtues of uncertainty, the singular
source suggests that resolution of the uncertainty at a later point in
time could be swift.
In sum, this Part demonstrates that the uncertainty associated
with FERC’s determination for energy storage is not sufficiently
troublesome to justify inaction. Unlike many other types of
uncertainty, this uncertainty was not caused by the juxtaposition of
multiple actors or circumstances. On the contrary, the uncertainty
surrounding energy storage was intentionally embraced, with an eye
toward rendering the best outcomes, as regulators and stakeholders
become familiar with the different energy storage technologies,
values, and purposes. When the critical features of uncertainty are
analyzed it becomes clear that this uncertainty is consistent with the
general uncertainty that surrounds the energy industry, that the
scope is narrower than other types of uncertainty, and that the
source of the uncertainty is one federal agency intentionally seeking
to reap the advantages of energy storage in a world where the law is
struggling to keep up with the technology.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING THE REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY
SURROUNDING ENERGY STORAGE
Political scientists have developed considerable organizational
theory literature on the response of “the firm” to regulatory
uncertainty. 261 In the simplest sense, the analyses can be categorized
into four major response strategies: (1) avoid the uncertainty
(2) ignore the uncertainty, (3) adapt to the uncertainty, or
(4) advocate for more clarity to reduce the uncertainty.262 The choice
of response is affected in part by the type of uncertainty facing the
firm, but as Professor Hoffman and her co-authors have observed,
“investment decisions cannot be viewed solely from the perspective of

260. See Engau & Hoffmann, supra note 17, at 55-56.
261. See, e.g., Alfred Marcus et al., Firms, Regulatory Uncertainty, and the Natural
Environment, 54 CAL. MGMT REV. 5, 5-6 (2011).
262. Engau & Hoffmann, supra note 17, at 55 (arguing that “firms pursue four
objectives when responding to regulatory uncertainty, seeking to either avoid, reduce,
adapt to, or disregard this uncertainty”).
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regulatory uncertainty,” and there are certainly other factors that
trump this uncertainty.263
An avoidance strategy is usually reserved for the riskiest of
endeavors. 264 As Professors Engau and Hoffman remark, “[H]igh
regulatory uncertainty is more difficult to cope with than low
regulatory uncertainty, therefore forcing firms without sufficient
coping capacity to avoid uncertain regulatory environments and to
shift their business to more predictable ones.” 265 Avoiding the
uncertainty usually involves postponing decisions, waiting for more
clarity to prevent errors, or withdrawing completely from the
enterprise.266 This response is generally adopted by smaller firms
experimenting with suspect technology that has not yet gained largescale public commitment. 267
Ignoring the uncertainty involves adopting a “no regrets policy,” in
which, unsure of how government regulations will affect the firm’s
future, they adopt as many strategies as possible at once. 268 This
strategy is reserved for firms that are large enough to have a
substantial reserve to adopt multiple strategies, allowing for success
regardless of any regulatory outcome. 269
Adapting to the uncertainty is reserved for firms whose success is
threatened by the uncertainty of changes coming from new legislative
actions.270 The choices a firm makes in adapting its response to such
263. Hoffman et al., supra note 172, at 1244 (identifying timing, complementary
resources, and institutional pressure as other factors that can counter a response that
postpones investments).
264. Engau & Hoffmann, supra note 17, at 59 (“[F]irms exposed to high regulatory
uncertainty will avoid this uncertainty to a greater extent than firms facing low regulatory
uncertainty.”); Chowdhury, supra note 189, at 637 (“[O]nly when regulatory uncertainty
reaches unmanageable proportions does it challenge and undermine the effectiveness of
the regulatory system as whole.”).
265. Engau & Hoffman, supra note 17, at 59.
266. See id. at 56; see also Summit Farm, Inc. v. Comm’r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1240, 1243
(T.C. 1981) (There is “considerable legislative and regulatory uncertainty concerning
whether this plastic container would be banned in Minnesota. . . . [P]rudence and good
business judgment prompted Summit to adopt a wait-and-see attitude.”).
267. Marcus et al., supra note 261, at 9-10 (giving an example of petro-algae, an
immature technology today, as it remains unclear as to whether sufficient progress will
ever be made to justify its commercialization).
268. Id. at 9 (explaining that an electric utility, for example, may be unsure of how
government regulations will affect future energy prices and thus begin using multiple
forms of energy—coal, natural gas, wind, renewable, and nuclear). A similar concept is an
anticipator response. Christian Engau et al., Airlines’ Flexibility in Facing Regulatory
Uncertainty: To Anticipate or Adapt?, 54 CAL. MGMT. REV. 107, 117 (2011).
269. Marcus et al., supra note 20, at 9 (noting that electric utilities may have the
financial reserves to adopt such a strategy but that start ups in energy efficiency may not
have similar reserves and will thus be unable to adopt the strategy).
270. See, e.g., Nancy M. Carter, Small Firm Adaptation: Responses of Physicians’
Organizations to Regulatory and Competitive Uncertainty, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 307, 307-08
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uncertainty largely depends on costs—in these situations, firms aim
to limit costs such as “loss of autonomy, increased dependency, and
increased uncertainty.” 271
Advocating for more clarity is used by those who are likely to
benefit from such an investment. These firms participate in the
policy process themselves, with the aim of influencing
policymakers. 272 Contrary to an avoidance strategy, where a
stakeholder may stay away until more information is available, an
advocacy strategy seeks to enhance the effectiveness of the eventual
decision by actively acquiring more information to narrow the scope
of the uncertainty. Ernst & Young has documented an advocacy
response for firms exposed to uncertainty from climate change: “The
companies interviewed in this survey indicate a strong preference for
more regulatory certainty, but to a large extent, they are not waiting
for clarity and are positioning their businesses accordingly.” 273
Importantly, one strategy may not be right for every type of
energy storage stakeholder involved. The prior analysis in Part III
demonstrates that energy storage uncertainty does not rise to the
level deserving of complete withdrawal from energy storage. Energy
storage’s foothold demonstrates that there are sufficient varieties
that would not be classified as “suspect technologies.” Furthermore,
the nation’s energy grid cannot afford such a wait-and-see approach.
By the same token, energy storage stakeholders should not pursue
a “business as usual” approach that does little to track developments
on energy storage. This is particularly true of stakeholders operating
in traditional cost-of-service jurisdictions, where the prudence of
investments is carefully evaluated.274 It is important that these
stakeholders not turn a blind eye to the uncertainty they face so
as not to find themselves making decisions that a PUC may
find imprudent.
(1990). This type of strategic flexibility has also been analyzed in Engau et al., supra note
268, at 117-20.
271. Carter, supra note 270, at 308.
272. See, e.g., Engau & Hoffmann, supra note 172, at 48-49. See generally Amy J.
Hillman et al., Corporate Political Activity: A Review and Research Agenda, 30 J. MGMT.
837 (2004); Brian Schaffer, Firm-Level Responses to Government Regulation: Theoretical
and Research Approaches, 21 J. MGMT. 495 (1995).
273. ERNST & YOUNG, ACTION AMID UNCERTAINTY: THE BUSINESS RESPONSE TO
CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (2010), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/
Action_amid_uncertainty_-_The_business_response_to_climate_change/$FILE/EY_Action_
amid_uncertainty_-_The_business_response_to_climate_change.pdf.
274. See, e.g., Violet v. FERC, 800 F.2d 280, 281 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that the
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities found that Edison Electric was imprudent in
not cancelling a project once the “increased costs due to licensing delays, regulatory
requirements, and uncertainty surrounding various other aspects of the project” had
become “intolerably high”).
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It is possible that the strategy being deployed by a number of wind
farm developers could be categorized as “ignoring” the uncertainty.
This strategy involves capitalizing on the existence of complementary
resources, which can cause decisionmakers to invest despite a high
level of regulatory uncertainty.275 Many wind farms are pursuing this
strategy, pairing energy storage with their wind farm resources
already in existence. 276 Their ability to capture profits on their wind
farms can only increase with energy storage, but these entities have
diversified the risk to the extent that they will still profit regardless
of the energy storage component.
Similarly, some stakeholders may be seen as adapting to the
uncertainty facing storage. For instance, utilities in California have
been approved to build “permanent load shifting” demand response,
which is really a form of energy storage. By adapting its terminology
to that already accepted within the regulatory framework, these
utilities were able to seek approval for storage as part of their
demand response funding. 277
This Article urges energy storage stakeholders to engage in more
advocacy responses. 278 As Professor Mandel has said, “[i]nstead of
allowing the scientific and regulatory uncertainty to produce
stagnation . . . it may be possible to leverage the uncertainty to
achieve a more positive outcome.” 279 Energy storage developers could
even benefit from investments in the face of regulatory uncertainty
“if they gain a first-mover advantage.” 280 This Part provides some
advocacy strategies for energy storage stakeholders to function
275. Hoffmann et al., supra note 172, at 1244.
276. Notrees (Tex.), Xcel (Minn.), Laurel Mountain (W. Va.) and Tehachapi (Cal.) are
all wind farms employing energy storage. See Jeff St. John, Grid-Scale Energy Storage:
MEDIA
(Dec.
18,
2013),
4
Ways
to
Grow
in
2014,
GREENTECH
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Grid-Scale-Energy-Storage-4-Ways-to-Growin-2014.
277. See, e.g., Decision Authorizing Long-Term Procurement for Local Capacity
Requirements, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Rulemaking 12-03-014, at 2 (Feb. 13, 2013),
available
at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M050/K374/50374
520.PDF (approving Southern California Edison’s 2013 capacity procurement plan and
imposing a requirement that 150 MW be procured through “preferred resources,” including
demand response); see also S. CAL. EDISON, PERMANENT LOAD SHIFTING PROGRAM 1,
https://www.sce.com/wps/wcm/connect/a4e1543d-1cc7-46b3-8cf2-920cf3aa66af/SCE_PLS_
ProgramGuides_20140205.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (last visited June 14, 2014) (explaining
that Permanent Load Shifting “focuses on cooling [thermal energy storage] systems” in
which “[c]ooling is produced and stored during the time when energy charges are lower and
discharged at a later time when energy and peak demand charges are high”).
278. Cf., e.g., Reuters Ltd. v. FCC, 781 F.2d 946, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (documenting
the “assault” on the Commission to resolve regulatory uncertainty over the uses of
microwave radio stations when applications lay dormant at the Commission).
279. Mandel, supra note 249, at 76.
280. Hoffmann et al., supra note 172, at 1228.
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within the uncertainty, as well as some suggestions for federal
regulators to facilitate these efforts.
A. Strategies for Energy Storage Stakeholders to Function Under
Regulatory Uncertainty
Implicit in both advocacy and adaptation strategies are
affirmative actions to reduce or manage the extent of the uncertainty.
Advocating for clarity requires a significant expenditure of capital,
but FERC already has begun engaging with stakeholders on ways to
properly integrate energy storage into the existing legal regime. For
instance, stakeholders have proposed a number of solutions to resolve
this asset classification uncertainty, including squeezing technology
into one of the three existing categories, 281 creating an entirely new
fourth category for energy storage,282 or retaining the status quo.283
This section suggests additional pathways for stakeholders to
advocate for clarity. First, stakeholders can reduce uncertainty by
harnessing the benefits of federalism and seeking state initiatives to
fill the gap left by FERC. Second, stakeholders can petition FERC for
affirmative rulings on jurisdictional or cost recovery questions. Third,
stakeholders can continue to pursue additional funds for energy
storage research and development to generate more information that
further reduces the uncertainty. Each of these forms of actively
reducing uncertainty is discussed below.
1. Harness the Benefits of Federalism
The first advocacy strategy for investors considering energy
storage is to evaluate and encourage state actions that may drive
certainty. An oft-discussed benefit of our federalist system is the
ability of states to step in and fill a void left by the federal
government.284 Where the federal government is hesitant to provide
281. See, e.g., LUONG, supra note 19, at 21, 29 (“[T]ransmission is the most discussed
and controversial market for energy storage participation.”).
282. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 34, at 16 (“NHA recommends
further evaluation of treating bulk energy storage as a separate and distinct electricity
infrastructure asset class (i.e., Balancing Asset or Compensating Asset), capable of
relieving grid stresses through the absorption of excess energy during low demand periods
or rapidly providing capacity during periods of peak demand.”).
283. See LUONG, supra note 19, at 33 (“Increasing the renewable energy supply will
eventually create needs for energy storage to supplement all components of the grid
[including generation, transmission, and distribution markets]. As such, it follows that its
roles be carved out within the existing energy market structure. A new energy storage
asset category is not needed.”).
284. See, e.g., Shawna Bligh & Chris Wendelbo, Hydraulic Fracturing: Drilling into the
Issue, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2013, at 7, 8-12 (exploring the proliferation of
state fracking regulations in the absence of any comprehensive federal action).
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clarity on an issue, as is the case with FERC, state legislatures and
PUCs may act to force the issue. Although state initiatives with
respect to energy storage could generate inconsistencies that drive
stakeholders to appeal to the federal government for relief or
clarification, 285 state initiatives may also be effective in establishing a
path forward toward certainty. This may occur through successful
state legislative or PUC programs that gather additional information
or begin to coalesce around a more unified set of rules.
One example can be found in California, the first state to move
toward providing more certainty for energy storage investments. In
2010, California passed the Energy Storage Law (AB 2541), which
requires publicly-owned and investor-owned utilities to procure gridconnected storage systems where appropriate. 286 The new law directs
the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to open a
proceeding to determine appropriate targets, if any, 287 for each loadserving entity to procure viable and cost-effective energy storage
systems. 288 The law provides that an energy storage system is
designed to “reduce the need for new fossil-fuel powered peaking
generation facilities” and to “provide the ancillary services” fossil
fuels had been providing,” 289 but it otherwise defines an “energy
storage system” broadly to include centralized or distributed, or
ownership by a utility, customer of utility, or merchant third-party,
but with the requirement that it must reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, reduce demand for peak generation, or improve the
reliable operation of the transmission or distribution grid. 290 In
February 2013, the CPUC began implementation of this law by
requiring that fifty MW of Southern California Edison’s long-term
capacity requirements come from energy storage by 2021. 291 In
October 2013, the CPUC continued to implement the energy storage
285. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 210, at 1500 (“[S]tates can be important catalysts
of a federal policy response by stimulating both pro-regulatory and anti-regulatory forces to
appeal to the federal government for relief sooner rather than later.”).
286. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2835(f) (2010) (such energy storage can be acquired
through ownership or a contractual right to purchase electricity from a third party).
287. Notably, the bill could have set the procurement target at zero, largely
eviscerating the impact of the law. The procurement targets must be “viable and cost
effective.” Id. § 2836(a)(1).
288. Id. § 2837(c), (h). The law required the proceeding by March 1, 2012, adoption of
an energy storage system procurement target by October 1, 2014, and attainment by
December 31, 2016, and a second target to be achieved by December 31, 2020. Id.
§ 2836(b)(1)-(2).
289. Id. § 2837(c), (h).
290. Id. § 2835(a)(1)-(3).
291. Decision Authorizing Long-Term Procurement for Local Capacity Requirements,
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Rulemaking 12-03-014, at 2 (Feb. 13, 2013), available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M050/K374/50374520.PDF.
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mandate for all of California’s investor-owned utilities by approving
more procurement targets and mechanisms totaling 1325 MW
of storage.292
Such mandates can provide important protection for investors who
will be subject to cost of service recovery evaluations. They protect
investors from the discretion of PUCs that are often unwilling to
approve rate requests involving technologies that exceed those
required by law.293 Rejected as overkill that harms the ratepayers,
these new technologies are often exactly the type of innovation being
encouraged on other policy levels. Past efforts to bet on the winners
of technologies that are not yet mandated have often left utilities
disappointed. Instead, utilities are now counseled to wait to
implement technologies until they are mandated and not jump ahead
of the regulatory curve.294
Despite the benefit of mandates for utilities, such mandates also
generate risks. Notably, such mandates do the exact opposite of the
benefit of uncertainty cited above—whereas uncertainty allows the
market to pick winners instead of the government, mandates allow
the government to pick the winners. 295 Such technology-forcing
endeavors have been widely criticized in the literature, running the
292. Press Release, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, CPUC Sets Energy Storage Goals for
Utilities (Oct. 17, 2013), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/
G000/M079/K171/79171502.PDF (Announcing Decision Adopting Energy Storage
Procurement Framework and Design Program, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Rulemaking 1012-07 (Oct. 17, 2013), in which the CPUC established a combined energy storage target of
1325 MW for three large utilities.) For perspective, 1325 MW (1.3 GW) is enough to power
185,000 homes (and enough to power the fictional DeLorean time machine featured in
Back to the Future (1.21 GW). See Joshua S. Hill, Norway Greenlights 8 Wind Farms to
Triple National Capacity, CLEAN TECHNICA (Aug. 28, 2013), http://cleantechnica.com/
2013/08/28/norway-greenlights-8-wind-farms-to-triple-national-capacity/.
293. See, e.g., Investigation of Merrimack Station Scrubber Project and Cost Recovery,
N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Order No. 25,398, 2012 WL 3548030, at *1 (Aug. 7, 2012)
(allowing recovery of scrubbers as required by air pollution laws); Application of Va. Elec.
& Power Co., Va. Corp. Comm’n, PUE-2012-00052, 2012 WL 3200605, at *4 (Aug. 2, 2012)
(allowing recovery of demand response programs required by FERC); see also David
Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New
Jurisprudence or Business As Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 47 (2012) (“[T]he regulatory
requirements pertaining to emission of GHGs (or in many cases, the lack thereof) have had
a significant effect on the outcome of permit proceedings and the reasoning of
decisionmakers.”).
294. See, e.g., MacElroy, supra note 238 (noting how Congressional inaction on carbon
“left early adopters of carbon technologies without the market incentives needed to make
them competitive”).
295. “SDG&E argued against mandated targets, saying they would be a barrier to costeffective deployment of storage: ‘It is inappropriate, premature and difficult to establish a
proper and cost-effective deployment level and ratepayers should not be burdened with the
cost of uneconomic storage projects installed simply to meet a mandated target.’ ” Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n, Energy Storage Procurement Workshop 4 (Jan. 14, 2013) (remarks of San
Diego Gas & Electric).
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risk of forcing technology that is not yet ready for commercialization
or picking a winner when another option turns out to be better.296
The cumulative impact of such mandates on utilities should also be
considered, as many states are already subject to mandates for
renewable energy and energy efficiency, generating backlash.297
Forcing these technologies too soon could result in disaster, with
utilities being forced to invest in higher-risk technologies than they
would otherwise invest in. Others have urged the inclusion of escape
valves in case the target is set too high for technology to keep up, as
the California energy storage mandate does, requiring the target to
be reevaluated every three years.298 Regardless of the outcome of
California’s experiment in federalism, such state actions can serve as
a catalyst toward ultimately resolving the uncertainty.
A second example can be found in Texas, where the state stepped
in to provide regulatory clarity for energy storage. Texas is in a
unique regulatory position, being the only state among the fortyeight contiguous states with its own interconnection, excluding itself
from FERC jurisdiction. 299 Although it does not address energy
storage serving as a transmission asset, Texas has explicitly
identified energy storage used to sell energy or ancillary services as
generation for cost recovery purposes.300 “Texas already deployed the
nation’s biggest sodium-sulfur (NaS) battery, which can power 4,000
residents in Presidio, Texas, for up to eight hours during an
outage.” 301 The utility, S&C Electric Co., is using a PureWave Storage
296. But cf., e.g., MATTHEW DEAL ET AL., CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, ELECTRIC ENERGY
STORAGE: AN ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 8 (2010) (The
California PUC has acknowledged that it needs to “[c]ompare the costs and benefits of
various types of EES with those of other load-shifting and emissions reduction strategies
(including energy efficiency, demand response, and renewable energy procurement), in
order to determine how ratepayer funds can be optimally committed.”).
297. See, e.g., John Funk, FirstEnergy Wants to Cap Ohio Energy Efficiency Mandates,
(Nov.
26,
2012),
Arguing
Costly
Market
Interference,
CLEVELAND.COM
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2012/11/firstenergy_wants_to_cap_ohio.html
(describing the Ohio utility that is desperately seeking a legislator to sponsor their bill
freezing the energy efficiency mandates); Kyle Rosas, Energy Storage Required, BLACKLE
MAG. (Oct. 2, 2012), http://blacklemag.com/technology/the-importance-of-energy-storage/
(noting that in California, the energy storage mandate was opposed by all three major
utility companies—Pacific Gas & Electric, Edison, and Sempra—as well as the consumer
group Division of Ratepayer Advocates).
298. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2836 (2011).
299. Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/
industries/electric/indus-act/rto/ercot.asp (last updated Oct. 17, 2011).
300. TEX. UTIL. STAT. ANN. § 35.152 (West 2011) (“Electric energy storage equipment
or facilities that are intended to be used to sell energy or ancillary services at wholesale are
generation assets.”); see also Project #39917, PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX.,
http://www.puc.texas.gov/industry/projects/rules/39917/39917.aspx (last visited June 14,
2014).
301. Roberts, supra note 55, at 48.
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Management System to control the system, including storing grid
power and dispatching it back to the grid as needed. “This is the first
time a state PUC has allowed rate-based recovery for a distributed
energy storage project.” 302 As stakeholders have indicated,
“[w]ithout the right pressure from the Public Utilities Commission
(PUC), grid-scale utility storage will remain a good idea that will
likely never get implemented.” Ed Cazalet of Megawatt Storage
Farms alluded to utilities that claim, “ ‘We can’t sign this storage
contract until we have a regulation telling us to do that.’ ” 303

2. Encourage FERC to Develop Case-by-Case Precedent
A second strategy for functioning within this uncertainty involves
stakeholders approaching FERC for advance orders on case-specific
projects. FERC can assert jurisdiction over energy storage through
either its authority over transmission services or through its
authority over wholesale electricity transactions. Energy storage
developers also can use FERC’s processes to obtain affirmative orders
from FERC regarding their specific asset classification situation,
reflecting another advocacy response.
There are already a few examples of developers seeking an
affirmative declaration from FERC that their energy storage
facilities qualify as wholesale transactions under FERC jurisdiction
or as “transmission assets” justifying incentive-based rates. In
Norton Energy Storage, L.L.C., FERC held a compressed air energy
storage facility was subject to its exclusive jurisdiction under section
201 of the FPA through its jurisdiction over wholesale electricity
rates.304 This compressed air facility converted non-storable electric
energy to storable compressed air, a process known as the
conversion/storage cycle. 305 FERC held it was this conversion/storage
cycle that separated the storage facility from other facilities that
consume energy that is sold for end use, an action outside the
Commission’s jurisdiction. 306 It reached this decision by comparing
the compressed air facility to pumped storage hydroelectric facilities,
which are traditionally subject to FERC jurisdiction under section
201. 307 A compressed air facility, like a pumped storage hydroelectric
302. Id. at 49.
303. Eric Wesoff, Energy Storage Needs Better Utility Policy, Language, Culture to
Succeed, GREENTECH MEDIA (July 28, 2010), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/
energy-storage-needs-change-in-utility-policy-language-and-culture.
304. Norton Energy Storage, L.L.C., 95 FERC ¶ 61,476, slip op. at 7 (June 29, 2001).
305. Id. at 2.
306. See id. at 7.
307. Id.
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facility “is not a source of new energy,” as the energy is converted but
is not consumed.308
In Western Grid Development, L.L.C., FERC classified a proposed
sodium sulfur battery storage project as a wholesale transmission
facility. 309 Like in Norton Energy, L.L.C., the Commission used
analogies to other energy facilities to reach its decision. Specifically,
FERC compared the battery storage “to capacitors in the sense that
they will be operated to provide electricity to the transmission grid to
maintain system reliability, rather than to act as an energy or
capacity resource.” 310 However, the Commission emphasized this
decision was not a general policy determination regarding the
jurisdiction of battery storage but rather limited to the specific facts
of the facility at hand. 311 These batteries are similar to substation
equipment already used in many wholesale transmission system
facilities, will be operated by the California ISO, and will not
participate in any wholesale electricity markets—all of which are
characteristics that led FERC to designate them as transmission
facilities. 312 Western Grid will pay retail energy prices when taking
power from the grid, will receive retail credit when reliability
concerns trigger a release of energy, and will also “pass through any
incremental market revenues to customers through a PTO tariff.” 313
Importantly for those who are concerned about double-counting,
Western Grid will not retain revenues outside of the transmission
access charge. 314
Although such case-by-case analyses can carry with them high
transaction costs, they allow entities to realize one of the benefits of
uncertainty—flexibility to respond to specific situations in lieu of an
overbroad, one-size-fits-all approach. As is demonstrated above, they
also begin to provide factual energy storage scenarios that provide
benchmarks for analogizing and distinguishing future energy storage
projects. Although there is disagreement about FERC’s approach to
energy storage, forcing the issue will provide more opportunities for
scrutiny and evaluation. The more applicants that use this approach,

308. Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted).
309. Western Grid Development, L.L.C., 133 FERC ¶ 61,029, slip op. at 1 (Oct. 12,
2010).
310. Id. at 6-7.
311. Id. at 6 (noting that this is subject to CAISO approval of projects through their
transmission plan).
312. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., supra note 92, at 4; Western Grid Development,
L.L.C., 130 FERC ¶ 61,056, slip op. at 14 (Jan. 21, 2010).
313. Western Grid Development L.L.C., supra note 312, at 7.
314. Id. at 15.
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the broader the precedent for energy storage will grow, establishing
gradual norms that can narrow the range of uncertainty.
3. Develop More Information
A last strategy for functioning within the uncertainty is to develop
more information through enhanced research and development.
Stakeholders can use the period of uncertainty to gather superior
information that leads to more effective and accurate
decisionmaking. This is particularly the case where any harm caused
by delaying regulatory certainty is surpassed by the benefits of a
more informed decision. 315 As Professor Elliot describes,
By regulating too soon we may not only regulate the wrong thing,
but we may regulate in the wrong way. To be more precise, it may
be that if we had waited a little while, we would have developed
regulatory tools and techniques that are better by an amount that
more than compensates for the harm that comes about in the
meantime. 316

As much as certainty is valued, many stakeholders might value
the opportunity to develop more information and shape the rules in a
way that enhances effectiveness. 317 One advantage of withholding
regulation, and thus creating uncertainty, is that doing so allows
regulators more time to collect information, refine the purpose and
feasibility of a law, and facilitate the proper means to implement
their policies. 318 One example can be found in modeling
advancements. MISO and PJM have independently determined that
better modeling is required to better assess the role of energy storage

315. Elliott, supra note 234, at 264-65 (pointing to the delay in providing regulatory
certainty regarding acid rain as an example of a delay and period of regulatory uncertainty
that resulted in better regulation compared to that of climate change).
316. Id. at 264; see also Warren G. Lavey, Making and Keeping Regulatory Promises,
55 FED. COMMS. L.J. 1, 15 (2002) (Even after significant time is spent developing a final
decision, “the FCC may identify flaws in the rules it adopted from market experience, by
assessing changing market conditions, by developing a new evaluation of options, or after
judicial reversal.”).
317. See, e.g., Fremeth & Richter, supra note 184, at 146 (arguing that more firms
should use the advocating response in the face of environmental regulatory uncertainty, in
which firms advocate for pragmatic, progressive policies, which enable them to shape
future regulation in their favor). But see the extensive literature on rent-seeking, much of
which suggests that stakeholders may use this opportunity only to shape rules in a way
that favors themselves.
318. See Elliott, supra note 234, at 263; see also id. at 265 (“When we can afford to, we
should wait until we understand a problem well enough to develop a sensible, effective
regulatory approach—rather than rushing off to ‘do something’ as soon as the scientists tell
us that there is a problem.”).
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in transmission planning. 319 Technology continues to advance to aid
those in the energy storage community to find a way to integrate
these multi-faceted services into the existing legal regime. 320 To do
otherwise can have serious consequences. There could be more
energy storage start-up bankruptcies and more discontent within the
emerging industry if the agency jumped the gun and regulated before
more complete information about the value, effects, and integration
was developed.
This information gathering will be helped by recent public and
private funds that have been earmarked for energy storage and other
smart grid technologies. On the public level, the Advanced Research
Projects Agency – Energy (ARPA-E) has received approximately $770
million since 2009 to support the development of innovative energy
technologies. 321 On the private level, “[a]ccording to a recent survey
by Ernst & Young, energy storage was the largest segment for
cleantech investment in the third quarter of 2011, increasing by
1,932 percent over the same period last year.” 322 The Internal
Revenue Service is also providing a tax credit equal to thirty percent
of the specified advanced energy property for qualifying advanced
energy projects. 323
Political scientists argue that “high regulatory uncertainty
denotes a lower availability of information on the respective
regulation than is available under low regulatory uncertainty.”324
Therefore, as more information develops, stakeholders may serve to
reduce the uncertainty surrounding energy storage even further. In

319. MISO ENERGY STORAGE REPORT, supra note 78, at 1-4 (“MISO needs to improve
storage modeling.”); see also ABDURRAHMAN ET AL., supra note 119, at 2 (PJM identifying
better models as a fundamental need for energy storage); Bhatnagar, supra note 159, at 7.
320. “The new software will allow companies and utilities to understand how a given
storage system could perform multiple functions, creating multiple streams of revenue that
together allow the owner of the energy storage system to make a profit. It also does an
analysis of which revenue streams are something that can actually be captured, given
existing regulations.” Kevin Bullis, Building the Business Case for Energy Storage, MIT
TECH. REV. (June 14, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/view/516146/building-thebusiness-case-for-energy-storage/.
321. ARPA-E Awards $130 Million for 66 Transformational Energy Technology
Projects, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Nov. 28, 2012), http://energy.gov/articles/arpa-e-awards130-million-66-transformational-energy-technology-projects.
322. KEMA, COPPER DEV. ASS’N, MARKET EVALUATION FOR ENERGY STORAGE IN THE
UNITED STATES 4-1 (2012), available at http://www.copper.org/about/pressreleases/pdfs/
kema_report.pdf.
323. “Specified advanced energy property” includes property designed for use in the
production of energy from energy storage systems. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-12, Qualifying
Advanced Energy Project Credit (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-1312.pdf.
324. Engau & Hoffmann, supra note 17, at 59.
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short, developers should have sufficient confidence and strategies to
“power through” the uncertainty associated with energy storage.
B. Strategies for Regulators to Narrow the
Range of Regulatory Uncertainty
The approaches for stakeholders will be most effective if
regulators can also work to narrow the range of uncertainty involved
in energy storage. Although a number of strategies could be
discussed, 325 this section considers two feasible options. First, PUCs
can reduce cost recovery uncertainty through cost recovery
protections. Second, FERC can reduce cost and jurisdictional
uncertainty by providing some parameters to cabin its discretion and
applying such parameters to produce consistent outcomes. Each of
these is discussed below.
1. Constrain the Regulatory Uncertainty
Although mandates were discussed earlier as a way to constrain
PUC discretion,326 PUCs can also affirmatively act in ways to reduce
the risks for new technologies. First, state PUCs may be able to
provide some pre-approval for energy storage applicants in the form
of a prudence determination. 327 As an example, a 2011 Florida law
required risk reduction, in that “the [PSC] shall provide for full cost
recovery . . . of all reasonable and prudent costs incurred by a
provider for renewable energy projects that are zero greenhouse gas
emitting at the point of generation . . . .” 328
Second, some PUCs even allow utilities to implement creative
alternatives to reduce their risk in questionable investments. PUCs
have allowed “tariffed rates” 329 and feed-in-tariffs 330 to recover the
325. See, e.g., Fabrizio, supra note 182, at 792 (discussing strategies that have been
proposed to reduce the risk of investment, such as shared risk, and binding the regulatory
body to make it more costly to change their mind).
326. See supra Part IV.A.1.
327. JIM LAZAR & DAVID FARNSWORTH, INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS IN
ELECTRIC RATES 17, 21-22 (2011), available at www.raponline.org/document/download/
id/4670; Wiranowski, supra note 206, at 376-77 (“Utilities also face regulatory uncertainty,
especially regarding cost recovery, so utilities often seek pre-approval from their regulators
in the form of a prudence determination. . . . For example, if a utility can secure a
statutorily guaranteed return for particular kinds of investments like renewable energy
generation, it can avoid the uncertain process of the state regulator’s cost-benefit analysis
for those investments.”).
328. FLA. STAT. § 366.92(4) (2011).
329. Public Service Company of New Mexico, N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 10-00037UT, 2010 WL 3937778, at *3 (Aug. 31, 2010).
330. Feed-in Tariffs, Haw. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, No. 2008-0273, 2009 WL 3756418, at *1
(Sept. 25, 2009).
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costs of renewable projects. PUCs have also granted greater weight to
a utility’s own estimate of costs and potential electricity production of
a proposed project than an outside statistical estimate.331 So long as
the utility’s projections have been made in good faith, a utility can
sometimes assume that its numbers will be presumed legitimate
instead of being worried that the PUC will always need to conduct its
own study. 332 Other PUCs have approved “spot market prices” that
lowered consumer’s bills and reduced uncertainty for utilities. 333
2. Develop Parameters and Apply Them Consistently
A second method for regulators to narrow the range of uncertainty
is for FERC to adopt some limiting principles on its case-by-case
assessment. For instance, although FERC was loathe to commit to
specific qualifications, limits, or incentives required during its
rulemaking on market incentives, FERC did provide three situations
creating rebuttable presumptions that the requirements of section
219 are satisfied: (1) transmission projects that result from a fair and
open regional planning process that considers and evaluates projects
for reliability and/or congestion and is found to be acceptable to the
Commission; (2) a proposed project located in a National Interest
Electric Transmission Corridor; or (3) a project that has received
construction approval from an appropriate state commission or state
citing authority. 334 If energy storage meets any of these three
conditions, its proposal for incentive-based rates carry a rebuttable
presumption of approval. 335
FERC also provided a number of other relevant parameters that it
would apply to future decisions. First, FERC interpreted “section 219
to promote capital investment in a wide range of infrastructure
investments that can have either reliability or congestion benefits
rather than investments that have both reliability and congestion
benefits.” 336 Second, applicants are required “to show some nexus
between the incentives being requested and the investment
being made, i.e., to demonstrate that the incentives are rationally
related to the investments being proposed.” 337 Third, FERC will not
331. See, e.g., Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 70 N.H. P.U.C. 164, 224
(Apr. 18, 1985).
332. See id.
333. Retail Electricity Market: End State of Default Service, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
No. 2011-2237952, 2013 WL 652517, at *15 (Feb. 14, 2013).
334. FERC Order No. 679, supra note 141, ¶ 58.
335. Id.
336. Id. ¶ 42.
337. Id. ¶ 48.
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impose size limits on eligible projects or condition approval on
market power findings. 338
FERC can develop similar benchmarks for energy storage,
perhaps taking a functional approach to asset classifications. As
more cases present themselves, categories will begin to develop
and certain factual scenarios will become more predictable. If
the industry can come to anticipate the outcome of these cases, a
norm will eventually develop that can provide more confidence in
expected future outcomes. Although there may not be consistency
across jurisdictions, there should at least be consistency within a
jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt about the vast potential found in energy storage.
According to some estimates, “[t]he U.S. energy storage market
exceeded $1 billion in 2011 and could surpass the $5 billion mark in
2014.”339 “[A]nnual global demand for grid-scale energy storage will
reach an astounding 185.4 gigawatt-hours (GWh) by 2017 and
represent a $113.5 billion incremental revenue opportunity for an
industry that currently generates sales of $50 to $60 billion a
year.” 340 In 2009, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) awarded
$185 million of $778 million in smart grid funding to energy storage
initiatives. DOE loan guarantees have supported many of the energy
storage projects discussed above, 341 and legislation proposing tax
credits for energy storage technologies continues to be introduced. 342
338. Id.
339. Roberts, supra note 55, at 46. “Lux Research predicts that the demand for grid
storage applications will grow nearly ninefold from $200 million in 2012 to $10.4 billion in
2017.” Barbara Vergetis Lundin, Pacific Gas and Electric Launches $3.3M Energy Storage
System, FIERCEENERGY (May 29, 2013), http://www.fierceenergy.com/story/pacific-gas-andelectric-launches-33m-energy-storage-system/2013-05-29.
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Global Demand by 2017, ALT. ENERGY STOCKS (Apr. 4, 2012, 5:50 AM),
http://www.altenergystocks.com/archives/2012/04/gridscale_energy_storage_lux_predicts_1
135_billion_in_global_demand_by_2017.html (citing LUX RESEARCH, GRID STORAGE UNDER
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available at http://info.luxresearchinc.com/Portals/86611/docs/research%20downloads/2012/
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341. See, e.g., U.S. P’SHIP FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FIN., THE CLEAN ENERGY
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To realize its full potential, however, energy storage also needs to
be integrated into the labyrinth of regulated and restructured energy
regimes. The uncertainties are numerous. It is unclear whether
restructured market rules will allow energy storage services to
compete on even playing fields. If the market rules are amended to
allow more even competition between energy storage and traditional
generation assets, it is unclear if the markets will account for the
variety of energy storage services. It is unclear whether utilities will
be able to receive compensation through their rates where many
PUCs are focused on the least-cost alternative. Furthermore,
different uncertainties are resolved at different times. For instance,
it has been suggested that uncertainties in restructured markets may
be resolved more quickly than those in regulated markets. 343 It will
be interesting to see whether California’s utilities respond to the new
energy storage mandate by obtaining their own resources or whether
they will contract with Independent Power Producers to fulfill the
majority of their needs. This Article is not intended to minimize the
challenges posed by regulatory uncertainty, but to caution our
response. Without diagnosing the different varieties of uncertainty,
we run the risk of perpetuating inaction.
By characterizing the regulatory uncertainty surrounding energy
storage, this analysis reveals that it is of a manageable variety, a
variety that will allow energy storage to develop even within a zone
of uncertainty. In fall 2004, Navigant Consulting conducted a
comprehensive survey to solicit the insights of utility leaders into the
key challenges surrounding regulatory uncertainty and the
implications on the rate-case and ratemaking activities of gas and
electric distribution utilities. “The message, heard loud and clear,
was that regulatory uncertainty is real and remains one of the most
critical issues in the North American energy industry. It must be
better managed.” 344
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